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PREFACE
During my political infancy, I learned as an intern in 
the summer of 1977 from one of the masters of politics, 
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. Under his aegis two summers 
later, I also worked directly for the Democratic Steering 
and Policy Committee; throughout, I appreciated the oppor- 
tunities to view politics firsthand. But I left the
Steering and Policy Committee with more questions than when
I arrived. For example, did this organization really aid
the Speaker? By writing this masters thesis, I found the
answer.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the extent to which the 
Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, hereinafter 
referred to as the DSPC, in the House of Representatives has 
conformed, or failed to conform, to a key segment of party 
government theory. The specific focus is on the extent to 
which the DSPC has helped or hindered the Speaker in his 
quest for more effective policy leadership through the Demo­
cratic party between the Ninety-third and Ninety-seventh 
Congresses. The proposed hypothesis is that the ability of 
the Speaker to guide programs through the House has not been 
strengthened significantly by the DSPC.
After some explanations for weak Speakers are presen­
ted, the composition and activities of the DSPC from its 
rebirth in the Ninety-third Congress through the Ninety- 
seventh Congress is evaluated in terms of its power to 
assist the leadership. The findings appeared negative. 
That is to say, the temper of the caucus and the president, 
as well as the size of the conservative coalition, prevented 
the DSPC from increasing significantly the capability of the 
Speaker to shepherd programs through the House and to induce 
a more unified party.
ix
THE DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND POLICY COMMITTEE 
AND THE SPEAKER
INTRODUCTION
For several reasons, the splintered Democratic Party 
traditionally has lacked a strong Speaker able to shepherd 
programs through to completion.1 First, leaders possessed 
few sanctions with which to force party discipline or few 
rewards to encourage party unity. Second, a norm of indivi­
dualism reigned among congressmen, because the Speaker 
had no control over the original nomination or reelection of 
representatives. Also, members rejected the notion of a 
fortified Speaker since it indicated a diminished posture 
for themselves. Hence, the House stagnated.
In the 1970s, sentiments changed when President Nixon 
impounded funds; Congress thought its authority had been 
threatened.2 Moreover the seniority system, which allowed 
unregulated power to the old southern committee chairmen,
^See Mary P. Follett, The Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (New York: Longmans, 1902; reprint e d ., New
York: Burt Franklin, 1974), for a very good history of
Speakers.
^Opponents of impoundments maintained:
" . . .  [T]his practice undermined congressional 
control over appropriations, provided the Presi­
dent with an unconstitutional item veto, and 
contributed to the excessive growth of Presi­
dential power.” (William G. Munselle, "Presi­
dential Impoundment and Congressional Reform,” 
in Legislative Reform: The Policy Impact, e d .
Leroy N. Rieselbach (Lexington, Mass.: Lexing­
ton Books, 1978), p. 173).
2
3frustrated a dubious platoon of northern Democrats. 
Liberals believed that a stronger Speaker could compete with 
the executive branch and unify the party. Thus, they.sought 
to transform the dormant Steering Committtee into, what Carl 
Albert hoped, would serve as an "active and viable organiza­
tion. Under a reconstituted name, the Steering and Policy 
Committee materialized.
In 1933, Speaker Henry Rainey formed the first Demo­
cratic Steering Committee from a variety of leaders: the
Speaker, majority leader, caucus chairman, whip, and chair­
man of the Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules 
Committees. The fifteen zones into which the party had 
apportioned the country for legislative purposes elected one 
member apiece, usually the dean of the delegation.4 The 
entire Steering Committee chose from within its own ranks a 
chairman, vice chairman, and secretary.
As the executive body of the caucus, the old Steering 
Committee supposedly afforded all Democrats, via surrogates, 
a voice in shaping party policies. But the Speaker, 
majority leader, and whip dictated programs that the rest of 
the Steering Committee rubber stamped. During the early 
years, the group presented as its main function the facade 
of a unified front.
•^Quoted in "House Reform: More Moves Towards
Modernization," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 31 
(February 24, 1973): 419.
4George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Con­
gress (Nw York: Crowell, 1953), p. 335.
4Charades ceased when Speaker Sam Rayburn, who held a 
personal dislike for the assembly, abolished the Steering 
Committee. Instead, he preferred proteges like Wilbur Mills 
to help guide the H o u s e . ^ The last chairman of the organi­
zation tendered this reason: "Mr. Sam decides what will be
do n e ,"6
The next Speaker, John W. McCormack, reinstated the 
Steering Committee, in 1962, because members demanded a 
broader voice in the management the House. A close asso­
ciate of the leadership recalled that McCormack disliked 
members drawn from whip zones, a "bunch of nobodies" as the 
new Speaker labeled them.^ In order to counter doubts by 
McCormack, the Steering Committee added a bevy of ex officio 
members: the Speaker, majority leader, caucus chairman,
caucus secretary, and congressional campaign committee 
chairman. What is more, Speaker McCormack believed that he 
should run the House. Hence the chairman of the Steering 
Committee, Ray J. Madden, acquiesced by conducting few 
meetings. Madden offered this explanation in public:
^Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy (New York: McKay,
1963), p. 107.
^Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of 
Representatives (Washington, D . C . : Brooking Institution,
1967), p. 47.
^Confidential source.
5"There just haven't been any issues that the members wanted 
to discuss.®
In 1965, the Steering Committee established a formal 
office. At the same time it hired John Barriere, a know­
ledgeable disciple of McCormack who had served with the 
Banking and Currency Committee for several years, to devise 
and implement policies for the divided Democratic party. 
Ultimately Barriere emerged, especially since the Steering 
Committee remained relatively inactive, as an ombudsman for 
Speakers McCormack and Albert.
Furthermore, at no point in time did the old Steering 
Committee perform an important role; under McCormack and 
Albert, it produced mainly memos. Not until the 1970s did 
the Steering Committee gain prominence, in the eyes of 
reformers, as a possible key to party government.
The Party Government Model
For a long time, political scientists have deliberated 
over how to achieve greater effectiveness from leadership 
groups within the framework of Jeffersonian (united) 
majorities.^ In September 1950, for instance, sixteen 
intellectuals directed by George B. Galloway released a
^Quoted in Daniel M. Berman, In Congress Assembled 
(New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 239, cited by ibid., pp.
47-8.
^See James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy 
(Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), Part II, for
his analysis of Jeffersonian majorities.
6seventy page proposal for renovating party organizations in 
Congress.10 The authors believed too many legislative 
assemblies held leadership responsibilities. Specifically, 
Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee still controlled 
committee a s s i g nments;^ in the Senate, Democrats assigned 
this task to an informal group. Party leaders also blamed 
separate policy organizations for abandoned enterprises.^
Therefore, the political scientists prescribed revam­
ped leadership congregations in both the House and the 
Senate. A truly consolidated hierarchy for each party would 
propose programs, as well as determine committee seats. 
Moreover, the caucus could remove rebellious members from 
leadership committees by a vote of confidence at the begin­
ning of the next Congress. In addition, Galloway and 
company favored a binding rule for caucus decisions. If the 
rank and file still did not cooperate, they would be denied 
choice committee duties or patronage.13 The American
^ A m e r i c a n  Political Science Association, "Toward a 
More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the
Committee on Political Parties," American Political Science 
Review 44 (September 1950): supplement; see also Pendelton
Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New York: Norton,
1940); and E.E. Shattschneider, Party Government (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart, 1942).
1 -^-Galloway reviewed well the precedents for this sys­
tem. See History of the House of Representatives, 2nd e d .
Revised by Sidney Wise. (New York: Crowell, 1976), Chap.
5.
• ^ A m e r i c a n  Political Science Association, "Toward a 
More Responsible Two-Party System," p. 59.
l^American Political Science Association, "Toward a 
More Responsible Two-Party System," p. 61.
7Political Science Association report, despite criticisms as 
ill conceived, at least lodged explicit suggestions.
Members would lose a degree of freedom with well dis­
ciplined parties. On the other hand, the leadership could 
introduce legislation with a greater chance of p a s s a g e . -*-5 
Wilson baptized this model "perfected" party government;1® 
more common terminology has substituted the word respon­
sible. In a comparison to the British Parliament, James 
MacGregor Burns alleged:
Party government in action . . . leaves the
member . . . w i t h  what seems to some Americans
a shocking lack of independence. . . .  in this 
country the congressman blandly wonders back and 
forth across party lines. . . . here the Sena­
tor or Representative as policy-maker juggles 
party principles with alacrity, or often ignores 
them entirely, . . .
At the turn of the century, party government prospered 
in the House. The Republican Speaker, Joseph G. Cannon, 
actively transferred members from committee to committee in 
order to achieve policy objectives. In the Sixtieth
l^See criticisms by T. William Goodman, "How Much
Party Centralization Do We Want?" Journal of Politics 13 
(November 1951): 536-61; Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Res­
ponsible Two-Party System: A Commentary," American Politi­
cal Science Review 45 (June 1951): 488-99; and Julius
Turner, "Responsible Parties: A Dissent From the Floor,"
American Political Science Review 45 (March 1951): 143-52.
^ A m e r i c a n  Political Science Association, "Toward a 
More Responsible Two-Party System," p. 26.
l^Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1885, 1913), p. 117.
l^James MacGregor Burns, Congress on Trial (New York:
Gordian, 1966), pp. 36-7.
8Congress, for example, Cannon removed James Tawney from the 
Ways and Means Committee, because Cannon mistrusted his 
stand on tariffs. In 1909, James R. Mann joined the Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce Committee as its chairman to 
guard a railroad regulation bill for the Speaker.
Furthermore, Cannon, as chairman of the Rules
r
Committee, decided which bills the House would consider. In 
cases where Democrats refused to give the necessary two- 
thirds consent for passage, he decreed a simple majority 
permissible. Eventually, this action cleared the way for 
many b i l l s . ^  Special privileges also helped defeat 
undesired amendments. For instance, when Cannon once read 
the House roll three times, he delayed the vote until more 
of his supporters reached the House floor.^0 As to the 
aftereffects, George Rothwell Brown averred: "Organized
leadership in the House prevented disintegration of opinion, 
and tended to check actions springing from imperfect 
comprehension, passion, selfishness, and personal idio­
syncrasies. . • ."21 Similarly, the Democrats realized the 
potential of a disciplined membership. To assist their 
leaders, the King Caucus adopted this somewhat binding rule:
l ^ R i c h a r d  Bolling, Power in the House: A History of
the Leadership of the House of Representatives (New York: 
Dutton, 1968), p. 64.
19Ibid., pp. 63-4.
^ I b i d  . , p . 64.
21-George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress 
(Indianapolis: Bobb-Merrill, 1922), p. 16.
9In deciding upon action in the House involving 
policy of principle, a two thirds vote of those 
present and voting at a Caucus meeting shall 
bind all members of the Caucus, provided the 
said vote is a majority of the full Democratic 
membership of the House, and provided further, 
that no members shall be bound upon questions 
involving a construction of the Constitution of 
the United States or upon which he made contrary 
pledges or received contrary instructions from 
his nominating authority. . . .22
Nevertheless, the binding rule fell apart when many of 
its originators were defeated. The omnipotent Speakership 
collapsed, in 1910, due to a revolt by members who stripped 
the office of extensive prerogatives. Since the mutiny, the 
leadership has exhibited a continued weakness.
This Study
This thesis is concerned with the extent to which the 
Democractic Steering and Policy Committee, hereinafter 
referred to as the DSPC, in the House of Representatives has 
conformed, or failed to conform, to a key segment of party 
government theory. The specific focus is on the extent to 
which the DSPC has helped or hindered the Speaker of the 
House in his quest for effective policy leadership through 
the Democratic Party between the Ninety-third and the 
Ninety-seventh Congresses. The following hypothesis is pro­
posed: The DSPC has not significantly strengthened the
Speaker. That is to say, the ability of a Speaker to guide
22Cited by Randall B. Ripley, Majority Party Leader­
ship in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 62.
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programs through the House has not been substantially aug­
mented. Whereas, the canons of the Democratic Party 
provided the DSPC with the following authority:
The Democratic Steering and Policy. Committee 
shall serve as the Democratic Committee on Com­
mittees . . . and is herewith invested with
authority to report resolutions regarding party 
policy, legislative priorities, scheduling of 
matters for House or Caucus action, and other 
matters as appropriate to further Democratic 
programs or policies.23
Few scholars have scruntinized the DSPC; its role in 
committee assignments has even received little a t t e n t i o n . 24 
Charles 0. Jones wrote about the Republican Policy Committee 
in the 1960s. An overall inspection of its Democratic coun­
terpart has been o v e r l o o k e d . 25
Because the DSPC has received sparse attention, this 
thesis attempted to fill a gap in the literature. After 
some explanations for weak Speakers are reviewed, the compo­
sition and activities of the DSPC from its rebirth in the 
Ninety-third Congress through the Ninety-seventh Congress is 
evaluated in terms of its power to assist the leadership. 
For the sake of simplicity, functions are classified into
23"preamble and Rules Adopted By The Democratic Cau­
cus ," Ninety-seventh Congress, p. 6.
^ S e e  Waldman (1980); also note Shepsle (1978) and 
Steven Smith of George Washington University (paper forth­
coming) .
^ C h a r l e s  o. Jones, Party and Policy-Making: The
House Republican Policy Committee (Rutgers, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1964).
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general categories: dealings within the legislative process
and committee assignments.
For the recently completed Ninety-seventh Congress, 
the DSPC will be considered in detail. The author, who 
served with the group during the summer of 1979, traveled to 
Capitol Hill for a considerable amount of information. The 
present staff made some memorandums available on request. 
In addition, I conducted interviews off the record with 
individuals directly and indirectly associated, since the 
members gathered in closed session, for uninhibited conver­
sations and not to get anyone in trouble. Participants 
repeated stories and similar impressions inadvertently, 
thereby providing some cross verification in the process.
CHAPTER I
WEAK SPEAKERS: SOME EXPLANATIONS
In troduc tion
Since the Eighty-fourth Congress (1955), the Democrats 
have remained the majority in the house. From John W. 
McCormack to Carl Albert to Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Speakers 
have not easily led their members. Therefore, incidences 
involving wayward voting congressmen have been prevalent. 
In this section, several possible explanations are discussed 
including: the Speakers themselves, committee chairmen, new
members, competing coteries, and decentralized government.
12
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The Speakers
"No successor of Rayburn's," Nelson W. Polsby percep­
tively stated in 1964, "could have had the chance to build a 
personal following which through luck, time and his own 
peculiar genius made Rayburn a strong Speaker."1 Indeed 
John W. McCormick and Carl Albert epitomized unforceful 
Speakers. Appropriately, Randall B. Ripley described them 
as operating with "mainly personal appeals.
Above a l l , the Speaker bore few weapons to induce co­
operative behavior. He did not oversee initial nominations 
to Congress, an important area where the leadership could 
collect political dues. One aspect leading to some control 
came in the form of the Speaker personally campaigning for 
members in their districts and helping them to raise money. 
Yet these routines generally failed to instill, among an 
independent assembly, long term party loyalty.
Neither did the Speaker exert much influence upon the 
career of representatives in the House. The fifteen Demo­
crats on the Ways and Means Committee assigned committee 
seats. (This system excluded direct participation by the
-^Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 51.
^Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representa­
tives , p. 146.
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Speaker until late in Albert's reign.)^ Therefore, the Spea­
ker did not determine the membership of the crucial Rules 
Committee.^ jn fact, he displayed limited command over its 
deliberations as well. More important, the Speaker did not 
authorize chairmanships because of the norm of seniority.
However the Speaker dominated the communications in 
the House, a network that supplied information to congress­
men in exchange for support.5 Also, the Speaker could 
strategically use his power of recognition on the House 
floor to insure results favoring Democrats on the whole.® 
Greater authority over the referral of bills, the task of 
committee assignments, and the Rules Committee later became 
prerogatives under Albert. In Chapters II and III, these 
topics will be considered at greater length.
Speakers relied on their powers of persuasion most of 
the time, but this required the willingness to follow. For 
instance, when a group of freshman organized what the press
^See Chap. II of this thesis.
^Sam Rayburn did expand the membership of the Rules 
Committee. See Milton C. Cummings and Robert L. Peabody, 
"The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules: Analysis
of the 1961 Vote," in New Perspectives on the House of Rep­
resentatives , eds. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 253-80.
^Randall B. Ripley considered this job one of the 
most important duties of whips. See "The Party Whip Organi­
zation in the United States House of Representatives," 
American Political Science Review 58 (September 1964): 561-
76.
^The Speaker enjoys absolute power over recognition.
A member denied floor privileges cannot question the ruling.
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ticketed as a "confrontation" with Speaker Albert, the mem­
bers complained of weak leadership.^ Apparently, the rank 
and file missed "arm twisting."8 Nonetheless, Albert 
remembered that thirty-five freshman Democrats assisted 
killing a gasoline tax sponsored by the Ways and Means 
Committee. While deviating from the party position, the 
same members later criticized the leadership as ineffectual. 
Thus, because Albert had few formal authorities, he fell 
victim to unwarranted opinion. Many other factors have 
hindered the Speaker: the unconstrained freedom of
committee chairmen, insubordinate new members, rival groups, 
and the changes in the rules of the House in the 1970s have 
been a few of the roadblocks that prevented strong party 
leadership in the legislature. These circumstances will now 
be reviewed in detail.
Committee Chairmen
For most of this century, committee chairmen held the 
balance of power in the House. They selected the staff of 
committees, competent individuals who furthered the policy 
aims and influence of chairmen. By custom, committee chair­
men decided the number and jurisdictions of subcofimittees. 
Through enactments, they chose the subcommittee chairmen,
^James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of 
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutio®, 1981),
p. 398.
8Ibid.
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determined the membership composition, and set the agenda.
Members also depended on committee chairmen to remove any
impediments to "pet” bills.® While managing floor debates,
chairmen cleared away hurdles and extended their grasps.
Finally, conferees appointed by chairmen shaped the final
version of bills.
As time passed, committee chairmen seemed omnipotent.
Occasionally members revolted, but they achieved success
ardously because of the norm of seniority. An anonymous
representative confessed:
The toughest kind of majority to put together is
one to reform a committee in the face of opposi­
tion from the chairman. As you get closer to 
the top of the hierarchy, the pressures on 
people who normally would be counted on to aid 
reformers are enormous and even people who
normally would be classified as among the "good 
guys" rather than the "bad guys" tended to chic­
ken out. . . .I®
Within the House, a norm of committee autonomy further 
complemented the powers of committee chairmen. Closed 
meetings enabled chairmen to mold legislation as they saw 
fit, free from outside pressures. In this milieu, members
yielded to committee chairmen. On the House floor, chairmen
continued their authority. If a congressmen offered an
unfavorable amendment, the chairman simply asked his 
colleagues not to vote. Senior members preached that
®Randall B. Ripley, Congress: Process and Policy
(New York: Norton, 1975), p. 109.
l®Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He
Sees It (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963), p.
223.
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" [ L ] eg i sla tion should not be written on the House floor 
and "The committee has exhaustively examined the matter and 
has brought its expertise to b e a r . " ^  The floor would defer 
to the committee decision 90 percent of the time. Represen­
tatives usually granted requests by chairmen, since the 
public would not know.
In the words of Representative Richard Bolling, 
". . . the standing committee system and the inviolable
rule of seniority" established the power of these oli­
garchs. 13 For instance, the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Carl Vinson, ranked as probably the most influen­
tial House leader of the 1 9 6 0 s . ^  Because he essentially 
doled out politically significant military installations, 
Vinson practically controlled his fellow members.
Moreover, the Speaker neither assigned nor removed 
committee chairmen. At the start of each Congress, the
^-Quoted by Norman J. Ornstein and David W. Rohde, 
"Political Parties and Congressional Reform," in Parties and 
Elections in an Anti-Party A g e , ed. Jeff Fishel (Blooming­
ton: Indiana University Press, 1978); see also Richard F.
Fenno, Jr., "The Distribution of Influence: The House," in
The Congress and America’s Future, e d . David B. Truman 
(Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 52-76.
-^Quoted by Barbara Sinclair, "The Speaker's Task 
Force in the Post-Reform House of Representatives," American 
Political Science Review 75 (June 1981): 339.
- ^ R i c h a r d  Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: Dut­
ton, 1965), p. 93; for an historical perspective see Nelson 
W. Polsby, Miriam Gallagher, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, 
"The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of 
Representatives," American Political Science Review 63 
(September 1969): 787-807.
l^MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, p. 107.
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Committee on Committees compiled a slate of nominees for 
chairmanships based on the norm of seniority. Then the cau­
cus voted with a single ballot; this procedure forced mem­
bers to overturn the entire group before they could defeat a 
chairman.
New Members
The steep quantity and type of person that entered the 
House in the early 1970s exasperated the party leadership in 
the legislature. The seventy-five freshmen in the Watergate 
Class of 1974 encompassed slightly more than a quarter of 
the party. Such high turnover, which included forty-seven 
Democrats elected in 1976 and forty-two in 1978, firmly 
established a more junior institution with profound implica­
tions .
The basis for effective persuasion appeared thin. In 
1979, Speaker O'Neill confirmed this trait. While applau­
ding these congressmen as "highly sophisticated, intelli­
gent, talented people," O'Neill bemoaned they "didn't come 
up through state legislatures," "never ran for city council 
or county office," "ran against the system," "don't know the 
art of politics, or understand the art of compromise," "have 
been hearing about cigar smoke in smoke-filled rooms," 
"didn't understand why compromise and consensus is so
19
important," and "didn't understand what our party w a s . " ^
Hitherto, John J. Rhodes, as minority leader, observed:
The average Congressman of yesteryear was con­
genial, polite and willing to work with his 
colleagues whenever possible. . . . Today, a
large number of Congressmen are cynical, abra­
sive, frequently uncommunicative and ambitious 
to an inordinate d e g r e e . ^
The membership was the antithesis of an earlier 
generation. That is to say, fewer freshman willingly 
followed the Speaker or passed through an apprentice stage. 
In years with particularly large changeover, many Democrats 
came from former Republican districts. Hence, the desire 
for reelection imposed immediate involvement; in the legis­
lative process, this point translated into challenges to the 
power structure.
Competing Coteries
Within an atomized House, several informal groups 
rivaled the Speaker by providing voting cues. Organiza­
tions that often hampered the party leaders included state 
d e l e g a t i o n s . por example, Lewis A .  Froman Jr. and Randall 
B. Ripley recalled the history of a $10,000 congressional
l^Ouoted by Theodore H. White, America in Search of 
Itself: The Making of the President, 1956-80 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1982), p. 212.
l^John J. Rhodes, The Futile System: How to Unchain
Congress and Make The System Work Again (McLean, Va.: EPM
Publications, 1976), p.7.
l^See Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups 
in Legislative Institutions," Journal of Politics 24 (Feb­
ruary 1962): 72-91.
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pay raise in 1964.1^ After an initial defeat, the House 
reconsidered the bill two months later but with only a 
$7,500 increase. Unanimously, the California delegation 
opposed the new measure and demanded that the original 
amount be retained. Indeed two factors, the size of the 
state and the failed first attempt at passage, combined 
successfully to persuade Speaker McCormack.19 When a number 
of congressmen voted against the leadership, a Speaker would 
not discipline them because he wanted to avoid a backlash. 
Moreover, the Democrats have not circumscribed an agreed set 
of philosophical principles.
Primarily southern members, known as the Boll Weevils 
and the Conservative Democratic Forum, also rebelled against 
the S p e a k e r . 20 Since the end of World War II, southern 
Democrats have worked to defeat or to amend legislation
l^Lewis A. Froman Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, ’’Condi­
tions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House
Democrats," American Political Science Review 59 (March 
1965): 62.
■^This finding confirmed research by David B. Truman 
who found that state delegations exerted considerable influ­
ence, especially with salient issues. The Congressional 
Party: A Study (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 249.
20john F. Manley noted this axiom:
"As congressional liberals gain power in the 
Democratic caucus, they run the risk of losing 
Democratic control of the House. As the 
southern Democrats have lost power in the Demo­
cratic caucus, they also voted more and more 
with the Republicans and won more and more of 
the votes." ("The Conservative Coalition," in 
Congress Reconsidered, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and 
Bruce I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977),
p. 93.
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sponsored by the House leaders. While supporting Republican 
proposals, the Boll Weevils demonstrated ^  strategic impor­
tance. In the Ninety-seventh Congress, for example, the 
assistance of conservative Democrats provided the critical 
margin of victory for President Reagan’s economic program. 
A Boll Weevil viewed this action as one that emanated from 
"moderates that hold the country together."21
Decentralized Government
Speakers have been further weakened through several 
changes in the rules of the House. Rayburn used to circum­
vent obstacles through negotiations with committee chair­
men. Now, even this avenue has been closed due to chairmen 
who lost power to their subordinates. Thus O'Neill has had 
to consider subcommittee chairmen in hopes of effecting 
legislation with all 139 of them (1979). With a more open 
House that experienced greater pressures from the outside, 
this job evolved into an even more difficult task.
As part of the Subcommittee Bill of Rights, passed in 
1973, committee chairmen lost supervision over budgets and 
staffs. The majority members of each committee assumed this 
authority, as well as the choice of subcommittee c h a i r s . ^ 2  
In a move to further distribute power, the caucus restricted
^Confidential source.
22por an extremely good elaboration see Norman J. Orn- 
stein, "Causes and Consequences of Congressional Change: 
Subcommittee Reforms in the House of Representatives," in 
Congress in Change: Evolution & Reform, ed. Norman J. Orn-
stein (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 88-114.
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members to only one chairmanship. Consequently, sub­
committee chairmen emerged generally less cognizant of their 
former mentors.
Because of the dispersal of power, these new autocrats 
provided greater direction in the daily operations of the 
House. During the 1970s, subcommittees conducted over 90 
percent of committee h e a r i n g s . 23 Without much disagreement, 
full committees usually ratified legislation.
Above all, subcommittee chairmen detected insufficient 
incentives to serve as assistants to the Speaker. With 
8,487 personal and committee employees (1976), freedom 
a b o u n d e d . 24 jn an environment with decentralized resources, 
chairmen of standing committees lost much of their value as 
partners in the legislative process, staffs gathered and 
disseminated information, the rank and file depended less on 
party leaders, and exchanges of knowledge for party support 
diminished. Furthermore, subcommittees focused on fairly 
precise areas. Thus conflicting interests could not be
23Lawrence Dodd and George C. Shipley, "Patterns of 
Committee Surveillance in the House of Representatives" 
(Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Poli­
tical Science Association, San Francisco, California, 
September 2-5, 1975), cited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer, "The House in Transition," in Congress Recon­
sidered , 2nd e d ., eds. Idem (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 42.
24This total broke down to 1,548 committee and 6,939 
personal staff employees. Harrison W. Fox Jr. and Susan 
Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in
American Lawmaking (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 171;
see also Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Con­
gressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government
(New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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balanced off against one another, and weakened in the 
process. Henceforth a higher chance existed that members 
listened to clientele groups or constituents, instead of the 
Speaker.
Public inspection of the House unintentially under­
mined the leadership. For example, recorded tellers 
decreased logrolling, the siding of members with the party 
against a certain interest. In addition, these votes 
stemmed from requests by just twenty-five members; wherefore 
many have been taken. In the Ninety-fifth Congress, for 
instance, 1,540 times recorded ballots took place. Realis­
tically the Speaker did not expect to win everytime, despite 
his party's majority status.
Through sunshine legislation, formal meetings and the 
formulating of legislation became more visible. In turn, 
pressures from lobbyists mounted on representatives. Every 
congressman obviously did not fall into line. When a "per­
ceived constituency" disagreed with a lobbyist, the member 
probably allied himself with the v o t e r s . 25 But over the 
past few years the number of interest groups grew dramati­
cally. Moreover, lobbyists outmatched the Speaker in 
ability to provide money and to rally constituents. Then, 
for the most part, outside influences succeeded because mem­
bers desired reelection.
25charles S. Bullock, III, "Congress in the Sunshine," 
in Rieselbach, ed., Legislative Reform . . . , pp. 217-8.
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Still, the support of voters remained integral to 
service in the House. If a majority of constitutents 
disagreed with the party leaders on a certain issue, the 
representative usually followed suit. Occasionally resis­
tance to the Speaker fulfilled political expedience at 
election time. Ralph K. Huitt commented on pressures emana­
ting from the district:
. . . one of the insuperable . . . obstacles
to powerful central leadership in Congress: the
member's relationship to his constituency is 
direct and paramount. This constituency has a 
virtually unqualified power to hire and fire.
If the member pleases it, no party leader can 
fatally hurt h i m .^6
26Raiph K. Huitt, "Studies of Congress and Congres­
sional Committees," in Congress: Two Decades of Analysis,
eds. Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody (New York: Harper
and Row, 1969), p. 140; see also Warren E. Miller and Donald
E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress, American 
Political Science Review 42 (March 1963): 45-56.
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Summary and Conclusions
The Speaker of the House has not completely controlled 
legislative events since 1910. The transformation of 
authority in the 1970s made the possibility for centralized 
leadership even less likely. Power flowed to subcommittee 
chairmen and increased the number of rivals to the Speaker. 
Junior members even demonstrated increased independence due 
to larger staffs as well as other information gathering 
resources. The leadership tried to adapt, but Speakers 
extracted not much more than a bare minimum of cooperation 
from most Democrats. In the fractionalized party, southern 
conservatives sided with Republicans against the majority. 
At same time, Democrats defected from the leadership because 
of pressures from constituencies, interest groups, activist 
presidents, or conflicting personal opinion. Finally, a new 
breed of congressman refused to heed constantly the commands 
of those in power. Accordingly, the number of issues that 
enjoyed a wide base of support remained limited. In the 
end, Speakers experienced understandable difficulty in 
achieving party unity from such a diverse assembly of ideo­
logues .
CHAPTER II
THE DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND POLICY COMMITTEE
IN THE NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
Introduction
During the 1970s, liberals tried to consolidate power 
in the Speakership. First, the three top party officials 
joined the Committee on Committees. Second, the Speaker 
obtained greater referral options over bills. Third, the
DSPC acquired the task of committee assignments. This sec­
tion will review the alleged change of influence with 
special emphasis on the reorganized DSPC in the Ninety- 
third Congress.
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Speaker Carl Albert espoused a complaisant form of 
politics; he would have never comandeered the House as a 
" C z a r . M o r e o v e r ,  the Democrats elected the leader of the 
chamber by a secret ballot. This fact supposedly restrained 
him from returning to Cannonism. A powerful Speaker, none­
theless, did not concern several important members. As 
Richard Bolling asserted, "It does not seem dangerous to me 
now, . . .  to restore a modified grant of power to the 
S p e a k e r . Evidently, fellow Democrats in the House agreed. 
In January 1973, at the start of the Ninety-third Congress, 
the caucus bolstered the Speaker, majority leader, and 
caucus chairman by positioning them on the Committee on 
Committees. Also the Speaker oversaw subsequent meetings to 
determine chairmen and committee assignments.
The Ninety-third Congress
In February 1973, the caucus restructured the Steering 
Committee and changed its title. Initially, the membership 
of the new DSPC consisted of twenty-three congressmen. The 
caucus awarded the three top party officials automatic 
places. In addition, the rank and file decided that Ray J. 
Madden should be replaced as chairman. In the Ninety-third
Ijames M. Naughton, "Mansfield and Albert: Key Men
in Struggle with Nixon," New York Times, March 26, 1973, p. 
A33.
^Bolling, Power in the House . . ., p. 266.
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Congress, he would lead the Rules Committee instead of 
William M. Colmer of Mississippi who had just retired. 
Apparently, Madden's colleagues thought that he would become 
too powerful supervising both organizations. Therefore, the 
Speaker, Albert, succeeded Madden as chairman of the DSPC. 
The majority leader and caucus chairman served as vice 
chairman and second vice chairman, further giving the 
semblance of a leadership group.
In addition, the Speaker played a major role in 
filling eight seats, none of which had any formal restric­
tions on the lengths of their terms. He directly appointed 
a representative from each of the women, black and freshmen 
members. The majority whip, chief and three deputy whips, 
all of whom owed their appointments to the Speaker and 
majority leader, secured spots on the DSPC at the behest of 
the caucus. In the beginning, the rank and file fashioned 
this structure so as to insure control by liberals. Still, 
many northern Democrats feared eight appointees allowed the 
Speaker too much power and urged that the number be re­
duced. ^  Finally, twelve approximately equal Democratic 
regions elected one representative apiece. For these indi­
viduals, the caucus established guarantees for involvement
^Majorie Hunter, "House Democrats Set Up Unit to Map 
Policy," New York Times, February 23, 1973, p. A24.
29
by junior congressmen, and a two consecutive term limita­
tion . 4
4A regional member with twelve years of completed 
seniority, or more, had to be replaced by someone with more 
junior status. This rule did not involve congressmen who 
had just completed one term on the DSPC and thus qualified 
to run for another.
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TABLE 1
DSPC MEMBERSHIP, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
Officers
Speaker Carl Albert (Okla.)*
Majority Leader Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (Mass.)*
jjc
Caucus Chairman Olin E. Teague (Tex.)
Whips
Majority Whip John J. McFall (Calif.)*
Chief Deputy Whip John Brademas (Ind.)*
Deputy Whip Richard Fulton (Tex.)*
Deputy Whip Spark M. Matsunaga (Haw.)*
Deputy Whip James C. Wright Jr. (Tex.)
Appointed (By The Speaker)
Julia Butler Hansen (Wash.), represented women*
Parren J. Mitchell (Md.), represented blacks 
Wayne Owens (Utah), represented freshmen
Elected (No. in Region)
# 1: Calif. (23) John E. Moss (Calif.)
# 2: Ariz., Col., Haw.,
Mont., N.M., Nev., Ore.,
Utah, Wash., Wyo. (19) Brock Adams (Wash.)
# 3: Mich., Minn., Wis. (16) Henry S. Reuss (Wis.) 
Melvin Price (111.)*# 4: 111. , Ind. , K y . (19)
# 5: Ark., Ia., Kans.,
Mo., Okla. (21) Richard Bolling (Mo.)
31
1ABLE l--Continued
tf 6: Tex. (20)
# 7: A la., Fla., L a . , 
Miss. (24)
# 8 :  G a N . C . ,  S.C.,
Tenn. (23)
# 9 :  M d . , N . J . , V a . ,
W.Va. (19)
#10: Ohio, Pa. (20)
#11: N.Y. (22)
#12: Conn., D.C., Guam,
Mass., P .I., R.I., 
V.I. (17)
Executive Director 
John Barriere
Wright Patman (Tex.)*
Tom Bevill (Ala.)
Robert G. Stephens (Ga.)
Frank Thompson Jr. (N.J.)
John H. Dent (Pa.)* 
Bertram L. Podell (N.Y.)*
Robert N. Giamo (Conn.)
^Members of the Steering Committee during the Ninety- 
second Congress.
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In 1973, the DSPC assigned the Speaker greater powers 
in scheduling bills and in drafting Democratic policy posi­
tions. By this authority, he could call bills to the floor 
under suspension of the rules four days a month instead of 
the previous two.® What is more, the leadership also could 
propose actions in the form of recommendations from the DSPC 
to the caucus. This mechanism would ideally free the rank 
and file from immersing itself in controversial debates. In 
April 1973, for example, the DSPC and then the full House 
approved an amendment to cease funding U.S. military 
involvement in Cambodia.
A year later, on a somewhat different note, a proposal 
to augment the staff of the DSPC circulated among the rep­
resentatives. An analyst with the Congressional Research 
Service, Frederick H. Pauls, reasoned that the resurrection 
of the DSPC meant that the caucus advocated more active par­
ticipation by the Speaker. A highly qualified staff 
associated with the restructured assembly would realize, in 
his opinion, an improvement in ". . . the role of the
Speaker as the central party and policy leader."®
A month later two members of DSPC, Brock Adams and 
Henry S. Reuss, grasped the initiative by proposing, what
®The DSPC could also schedule bills in excess of 100 
million dollars, which is normally forbidden under suspen­
sion of the rules.
^Frederick H. Pauls, "Argument in Support of Increa­
sing the Staff and Activity of the House Democratic Steering 
and Policy Committee," Congressional Research Service, June 
12, 1974, p. 3.
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they considered, an economic program. On July 23, the DSPC 
accepted traditional Democratic components like expanded 
public employment and unemployment compensation programs, 
but rejected calls for an independent price monitering 
agency and a cut in military spending. The following day, 
the Democratic Caucus unanimously followed suit. But, the 
encompassing nature of President Nixon's resignation in 
August suspended serious consideration of any plans for 
reform. Finally in September, the new President, Ford, 
released his own blueprint of budget cuts. By this time in 
the House, the Committees on Joint Economics and the Budget 
received most attention and credit for initiatives from the 
legislative branch. The DSPC had been left on the wayside.
Additional Reforms
A new plan, also unveiled in 1974, further increased 
the power of the Speakership. It authorized him to refer a 
bill to more than one committee, either simultaneously or 
sequentially. In addition, the Speaker could divide a bill 
and send portions of it to different committees. Yet, the 
greater flexibility that the Speaker received only provided 
him slightly more influence in daily legislative affairs. 
An important obstacle still remained in the Ninety-third 
Congress. The Ways and Means Committee constantly frustra­
ted the leadership. Due to frequent nonappearances by 
Chairman Wilbur Mills, health insurance and tax reform,
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areas high on the priority lists of many Democrats, failed 
to progress through the House.
Eventually, an explanation to these roadblocks gained 
public notoriety. On October 9, 1974, the Washington Metro­
politan Police arrested Mills drunk at the Tidal Basin in 
the company of a local stripper. Still, this episode might 
have been forgotten had Mills not enlarged the problem. On 
November 30, he appeared on stage in Boston -- to the amaze­
ment of his colleagues —  with the stripper. Concisely, 
Representative Sam Gibbons summed up beliefs about Mills: 
"He's flipped."^
When confronted with the alcoholic behavior of Mills, 
reformers debated options as the Democratic Caucus convened 
prior to the Ninety-fourth Congress. In a motion by Donald 
M. Fraser, the members agreed in a relatively close vote 
(146-122) to shift the job of committee assignments from the 
Ways and Means Committee to the DSPC. Fraser claimed: "Now
it (the DSPC) amounts to something."® The chief counsel of 
the old Committee on Committees, John Martin, despairingly 
anticipated several pitfalls:
The Steering and Policy Committee has unstable 
membership and staff. Hell, in two or four years
^"New Congress Organizes; No Role for Mills," Congre­
ssional Quarterly Weekly Report 32 (December 7, 1974): 3247.
®"New Congress Organizes; No Role for Mills," Congre­
ssional Quarterly Weekly Report 32 (December 7, 1974):
3249. The caucus had already made the DSPC responsible for 
the nomination of Democrats to the new Budget Committee in 
order to preclude the old Committee on Committees from 
weighing the composition in favor of conservatives.
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four-fifths of that committee could be 
different. And all the staff could be gone.
They won't have any memory. They're all around 
the Speaker's Office. Even he could be 
different in two years and the whole group of 
staff will disappear. I don't even know if 
they're going to keep any records. The point is 
they won't have very long memories. . . .9-
Regardless of initial doubts by subordinates, the 
power of committee assignments provided the Speaker a real 
mechanism to deal with recalicitrant members. Yet for the 
Ninety-fourth Congress, Albert did not fully employ this 
tool. Despite formal inclusion, the Speaker intervened rela­
tively little in the actual system. As one participant 
remembered:
He leaves most of the decisions to us. He 
really doesn't play that much of a role. But we 
give him pretty much what he wants. When he 
speaks in favor of some guy, that guy's got it 
greased!10
Also, the actual switch came midway in the selection 
process. An individual then on the staff of the DSPC remi­
nisced :
We got that thing (the committee assignment 
task) on a Wednesday or Thursday and the job had 
to be done the following week. We had no idea 
what to do or how to do it! I called the old 
(Committee on Committees) staff to get a little 
help. That's what I got— a little help. . . .
It was basically the nobility looking at the son 
who got it while expressing their disdain for 
the rebel m o b . H
^Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Demo­
cratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 307n. 
l^Ibid., p. 306n.
Hconfidential source.
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A week later, power became further relocated through a 
change in caucus ordinances spearheaded by Richard Bolling, 
a former Rayburn lieutenant. The Speaker had informally 
named Democrats to the Rules Committee with the majority 
leader. Now he claimed sole control over these appoint­
ments. Even though Albert spoke against the proposal, the 
motion passed by a resounding margin (106-65). 12 -phe 
Speaker theoretically would have to reappoint incumbent 
Democrats to the Rules Committee with each new Congress. He 
could also replace members should he be dissatisfied with 
their demeanor.
12j0hn Pierson, "Shaking Up the House: Will It Help,"
Wall Street Journal, December 2, 1974, p. A20; also cited by 
Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, p. 389.
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Summary and Conclusions
With his appointment to the Committee on Committees, 
the Speaker regained some influence originally lost in the 
revolt against Joseph G. Cannon. The new DSPC contained 
similar potential. At least the organization allowed Spea­
kers a vehicle through which influence might be exerted. A 
knowledgeable staff on the DSPC that did not emphasize 
patronage could also assist considerably. Furthermore, many 
reformers thought the small number of personnel that worked 
with the group in the early years as inadequate. Chapter V 
of this thesis will touch upon problems that the Speaker 
still faced with numerous and supposedly proficient 
employees.
Meanwhile, Albert saw his DSPC compile a set of pro­
posals in the Ninety-third Congress. But measures such as 
anti-war resolutions did not necessarily mean that the 
Speakership had become more powerful. Moreover, he found it 
another feat to lead programs into law. Democratic policies 
in 1974 fell short because of several possible reasons, not 
just bad timing. First, the executive branch, which was 
controlled by Republicans, still held the momentum in the 
introduction of legislation. Second, the general public 
viewed the ideas as not viable. Third, the Speaker could 
not generate continued support from within his own party.
While trying to unify the Democrats, the caucus forti­
fied the Speakership. Greater referral powers and added 
control over the Rules Committee overcame some longstanding
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weaknesses. After Mills fell into bizarre behavior, the 
members also provided the Speaker formalized authority over 
chairmen and committee assignments. Within this more cen­
tralized system, the Speaker could theoretically insist on 
greater party loyalty.
The DSPC in the Ninety-third Congress did contain 
representatives from all factions of the party. Consequent­
ly, members kept the Speaker abreast of prevailing opinions, 
and not that of a vocal few. On the one end, Adams and 
Mitchell embraced the most liberal disposition. At the 
other extreme, Teague, Patman, and Stephens possessed more 
conservative leanings. Yet a balance of Democratic phil­
osophy on the DSPC also included drawbacks. I will return 
to this point in Chapter V.
CHAPTER III
THE DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND POLICY COMMITTEE 
IN THE NINETY-FOURTH THROUGH NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESSES
Introduc tion
The election of 1974, which came almost immediately 
after the renaissance of the DSPC, brought into the House a 
large number of brash Democrats due to a Watergate backlash. 
At once, they significantly altered the composition and 
character of the chamber. No one knew if this new element
would follow the Speaker. The results weakened the conser­
vative coalition, one of the early reasons for the DSPC,
because of the presence of fewer Republicans with which
southern Democrats could align. Despite this clear advan­
tage, Speaker Albert and the DSPC still experienced problems 
in the Ninety-fourth Congress. The caucus rejected several 
of its nominees for committee chairmanships. Members of the 
DSPC composed the Task Force on the Economy and Energy, in 
addition to ethics reform legislation, but the measures 
encountered several obstacles in the House. These events in 
the Ninety-fourth Congress will be the first topic of this 
chapter. Then the DSPC will be examined in the Ninety-fifth 
and Ninety-sixth Congresses under a Democratic president, 
and new Speaker.
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The Disposal of Committee Chairmen
The DSPC, which assumed the responsibility for chair­
men and committee assignments in 1974, gathered on January 
15, 1975 to nominate chairmen for the Ninety-fourth Con­
gress. Yet, the Democractic Caucus still had ultimate 
authority over these choices through a majority vote. This 
fact let the rank and file change the party and make his­
tory .
O'Neill, then majority leader, moved to accept all 
representatives due chairmanships according to seniority. 
But Jonathan Bingham and many other participants disagreed. 
After he saw the initial opposition, Speaker Albert adminis­
tered a voice yote on the proposed chairmen. When no firm 
conclusion was reached, the Committee on Committees resorted 
to secret ballots. The first three appointments, which had 
no formal opposition, received endorsements: W.R. Poage for
chairman of the Agriculture Committee (the vote was still 
14-10), George Mahon for chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee (18-6), and F. Edward Hebert for chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee (14-10). Wright Patman confronted 
a declared challenger, Henry S. Reuss, for chairmanship of 
the Banking and Currency Committee. (Both individuals faced 
each other in the same room as members of the DSPC.) The 
vote that ensued displaced Patman by a narrow margin (11- 
13). The two Democrats next in seniority, William A. 
Barrett and Leonar K. Sullivan, failed by identical numbers 
(11-13). The Committee on Committees then sanctioned Reuss
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(15-9), who had accumulated the next highest amount of 
seniority.
The balloting on Wayne Hays for chairman of the House 
Administration Committee generated consecutive ties, some­
what expectedly.  ^ As soon as all the other chairmen were 
decided, a fourth attempt on Hays unearthed a changed vote 
against him (11-13). Thereupon the members chose the indi­
vidual who followed Hays, Frank Thompson Jr. (15-9), a 
representative also on the D S P C . 2
Nevertheless, the Democratic Caucus rejected Thompson, 
Reuss, as well as Poage and Hebert. This event forced the 
Speaker and the Committee on Committees to regroup. On the 
17th, they designated the second echelon: Thomas S. Foley
for Agriculture and Melvin Price for Armed Services (another 
congressman on the DSPC).^ Soon afterwards, the rank and 
file gave their blessing. Furthermore, the caucus retained 
Hays in an election that let members vote for one or the 
other, something that had not been done the first time 
around.
-^-Threats by Hays to use his power and a feared alli­
ance between he and Burton by the leadership apparently 
fueled opinion against him. Hays later accused Albert and 
O'Neill of orchestrating the vote in the DSPC. Of course, 
O'Neill disclaimed this allegation.
^Michael J.^Malbin, "Congress Report/House Democrats 
Oust Senior Members From Power," National Journal 7 (January 
25, 1975): 130-1.
^Due to insisting by a considerable number of aspi­
rant freshmen, the DSPC enlarged the Agriculture Committee 
to permit for sixteen new Democrats (and seven new Republi­
cans). Because of retirees, however, the total size only
increased by seven (36 to 43).
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TABLE 2— Continued
ft 5: Ark., la., Kans.,
Mo., Okla. (23) 
ft 6: Tex. (21)
ft 7 : A l a . , Fla., L a .,
Miss. (23) 
ft 8 : G a •, N.C., S.C.,
Tenn. (29) 
ft 9: M d . , N. J. , Va. ,
W.Va. (26) 
ftlO: Ohio, Pa. (22)
#11: N.Y. (27)
#12: Conn., D.C., Guam,
Mass., N.H., P.I., 
R.I., V.I. (21)
Executive Director
Edward Mezvinsky (la.) 
Wright Patman (Tex.)
F. Edward Hebert (La.)
M. Dawsin Mathis (Ga.)
Frank Thompson Jr. (N.J.) 
John V. Stanton (Ohio) 
Jonathan B. Bingham (N.Y.)
Norman E. D'Amours (N.H.)
John Barriere
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USPC NEW 
Replacements
Burton
Me tealfe 
Jordan 
Brodhead 
Davis
Obey
Udall
Bingham
Hebert 
Mezvinsky 
D 'Amours 
Stanton 
Mathis
TABLE 3
PARTICIPANTS, NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
Previous
Participants
Teague
Mi tchell
Hansen
Owens
Reuss
Adams
Podell
Bevill 
Bolling 
Giamo 
Dent
Stephens
Reason for Leaving 
(If Any)
Completed two term limitation 
as caucus chairman
Retired
New freshman representative 
New second and third termers 
representative8-
Became chairman of the Banking 
and Currency Committee 
Became chairman of the Budget 
Committee
Defeated for reelection to the 
House
aThe addition of a second and third term representa­
tive increased the size of the DSPC to twenty-four.
The Task Force on the Economy and Energy
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Five weeks before President Ford delivered the 1975 
State of the Union Address, Speaker Albert organized a task 
force composed of members mostly from the DSPC to devise an 
alternative program to the course outlined by the Ford 
administration.4 Shortly before the President's evening 
speech on January 13, Albert released the plan of the Task 
Force on the Economy and Energy in an event staged for the 
media.® He also impeled the chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee, Mahon, to expedite the public service jobs seg­
ment of the plan. Mahon cooperated, even though he 
questioned the profitability of the program. An aversion to 
instruction by members of the DSPC, as well as the recent 
expulsion of the three committee chairmen, overcame his 
doubts.® Therefore, Albert never introduced the decree that 
he had written.
A jobs program bill of $5.5 billion, which emanated 
from the Democratic plan, passed the House. But President 
Ford vetoed the measure as too expensive. Thereby, the
4Th ese members of the DSPC, besides James C. Wright 
as chairman, participated: Tom Bevill, Jonathan B. Bingham,
John Brademas, Richard Fulton, Phillip Burton, Barbara C. 
Jordan, Melvin Price, Henry S. Reuss, and Morris K. Udall.
^Joel Havemann, "Congress Report/Ford House Democrats 
Outline Programs for 1975," National Journal 7 (January 18, 
1975): 101.
®Sidney Waldman, "Majority Leadership in the House of 
Representatives," Political Science Quarterly 95 (Fall 
1980): 380.
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demonstrated support of an override in a resolution (1 7 -0 ).?
Yet the count on the House floor fell short by five votes.
One member of the DSPC clarified the reasons for defeat:
The members of the committee did not and do not 
go out and convince the members of their region 
to vote for bills. I don't get together with 
the members of my region as I should and could.
There are just too many demands on my time. Of 
course, I do speak with some of the members of 
my region on the floor, but not systematically 
and not comprehensively. The members of my 
region do not come to me as their representative 
on the committee and I do not keep in touch with 
them as I should.**
Another component of the Task Force embraced gas 
taxes, among other unpopular ideas with regard to energy. 
Congressmen did not willingly claim credit for politically 
costly alternatives. Still, the DSPC and the Senate (Demo­
cratic) Policy Committee united, by the end of February, on 
a strategy. Moreover, President Ford expressed a willing­
ness to work with the congressional l e a d e r s h i p . ^
Stumbling blocks existed, however, in the form of 
Representatives John Dingell, chairman of the Energy and 
Power Subcommittee of the Commerce Committee, and A1 Ullman, 
chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. Control of oil 
overlaped between the two. Dingell ruled on the price of
^Idem, untitled manuscript, 1977, p. 2-9.
**Idem, "Leadership in the House of Representatives: 
The 94th and 95th Congresses" (Paper delivered at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977), pp. 28-9.
^John G. Stewart, "Central Policy Organs in Congress," 
in Congress Against the President, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield 
Sr. (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 22.
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energy and Ullman on how much to tax the companies that 
produced it. While trying to facilitate cooperation,
Speaker Albert included the chairmen in numerous DSPC ses­
sions. Dingell and Ullman, who resented placement under 
this purview, absolutely rejected any suggestions from the 
Speaker for the direction of legislation. Since the two 
remained intractable, a combined policy failed to result. 
That is to say, the norm of committee autonomy appeared 
insurmountable. A leadership strategist further explained:
Why call a meeting of the Steering Committee and 
vote 12 to 9 for deregulation of gas prices.
The Commerce Committee could then call a meeting 
and vote 12 to 9 the other way. That just shows 
the opinions of the particular commit­
tees. . . .
Ethics Reform
Beginning in June 1976, a task force set up by Albert 
collected information on ethics reform with the intent to 
introduce legislation. David R. Obey as chairman, with the 
help of DSPC members Lloyd Meeds and Norman E. D 1Amours, 
completed a report just prior to the Democratic National 
Convention. Primarily, the document listed suggestions to 
avoid the misallocation of funds. As one precaution, the 
representatives proposed that the Speaker directly appoint 
Democrats to the House Administration Committee; greater 
accountability might then result.
lOWaldman, "Majority Leadership in the House of Repre­
sentatives," p. 382.
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But other members of the DSPC objected immediately. 
In particular, Phillip Burton did not want to create a 
powerful Speaker similar to Jesse U n ruh, under whom Burton 
served in the California legislature. *  ^ Nevertheless, 
Albert and the rest of the DSPC approved all the recommenda­
tions, in addition to a resolution that directed the House
Administration and Rules Committees to implement the 
package. When the Democratic Caucus reviewed the proposals 
on June 23, however, a fierce debate ensued. O'Neill, soon 
to become Speaker, withdrew the plan for the leader of the 
chamber to assume indirectly control of the House Adminis­
tration C o m m i t t e e . ^  When he saw the extent of the 
opposition, O'Neill realized this move as prudent.
The Composition of the DSPC
Roughly a year later, liberals reexamined the makeup 
of the DSPC. They believed that nine appointees by the 
Speaker permitted him too much power and that President
Carter would now lead the party, not O ’Neill. Alterna­
tively, some congressmen argued that the caucus should elect 
more seats on this organization. A plan distributed by the 
Democratic Study Group called for the three officers and 
twelve regionally elected members to remain intact, but the 
number of appointees by the Speaker would be cut to just
1:lA 1 lan J. Katz, "The Politics of Congressional 
Ethics," in The House at Work e d . Joseph Cooper and G. Cal­
vin Mackenzie (Austin: University of Texas, 1981), p. 101.
12Ibid., p. 102.
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four. The Caucus Committee on Organization, Study and 
Review preferred a slightly different format. Its chairman, 
Representative Neil Smith, wanted nine regional zones that 
elected two participants apiece, in addition to Speaker, 
majority leader, and caucus chairman.
As strange as it may seem, the politics of the race to 
succeed O'Neill as majority leader entered into the discus­
sion. It was revealed that members backed a reconstituted 
DSPC in order to weaken the power of O'Neill as Speaker, and 
to augment the influence of Burton as his second in 
command.13 When this scheme was discovered, the caucus 
dropped any plans to restructure the DSPC. Instead, the 
rank and file reinforced the Speakership by taking away from 
the Appropriations and Ways and Means Commitees the ability 
of each to select five members of the Budget Committee. The 
Committe on Committees instead, with O'Neill soon at the 
helm, would nominate these Democrats.
*•3"Washington Update," National Journal 8 (December 
25, 1976): 1834.
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TABLE 4
DSPC MEMBERSHIP, NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
Officers
Speaker Thomas P. O ’Neill Jr. (Mass.)
Majority Leader James C. Wright Jr. (Tex.)
Caucus Chairman Thomas S. Foley (Wash.)
Whips
Majority Whip John Brademas (Ind.)
Chief Deputy Whip Dan Rostenkowski (111.)
Deputy Whip William V. Alexander (Ark.)
Deputy Whip George E. Danielson (Calif.)
Deputy Whip Benjamin S. Rosenthal (N.Y.)
Appointed (By The Speaker)
Peter H. Kostmayer (Pa.), represented freshmen 
Barbara C. Jordon (Tex.), represented women 
Ralph H. Metcalfe (111.), represented blacks
Charles G. Rose (N.C.), represented second and third termers
Elected (No. in Region)
# 1: Calif. (29)
# 2: Ariz., Col., Haw.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., 
Ore., Utah, Wash.,
Wyo. (22)
# 3: Mich., Minn., Wis. (22)
# 4: 111., Ind., K y . (25)
Henry A. Waxman (Calif.)
Lloyd Meeds (Wash.) 
David R. Obey (Wis.) 
Morgan F. Murphy (111.)
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TABLE 4--Continued
# b: Ark., Ia., Kans.,
Mo., Okla. (22)
# 6: Te x . (22)
# 7: A l a ., Fla., L a .,
Miss. (23)
# 8: Ga., N.C., S.C.,
Te n n . (28)
# 9: M d . , N . J . , V a . ,
W.Va. (24)
#10: Ohio, Pa. (27)
#11: N.Y. (27)
#12: Conn., D.C., Guam,
Mass., N.H., P.I., 
Ft. I. , V.I. (20)
Executive Director
Richard Bolling (Mo.) 
Eligio de la Garza (Tex.)
Walter Flowers (Ala.)
M. Dawsin Mathis (Ga.)
Robert A. Roe (N.J.) 
Jonathan H. Dent (Pa.) 
Jonathan B. Bingham (N.Y.)
Norman E. D 'Amours (N.H.)
Irvine Sprague
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TABLE 5
DSPC NEW PARTICIPANTS, NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
Replacements
Foley
Brademas*
Alexander
Danielson
Rosenthal
Kostmayer
de la Garza
Flowers
Bolling
Dent
Sprague
Previous
Participants
Burton 
MeFa11 
Fulton 
Matsunaga 
Wright 
Brodhead 
Patman 
Hebert 
Mezvinsky
Stanton 
Barriere
Reason for Leaving 
(If Any)
Lost race for majority leader 
Lost race for majority leader 
Resigned from the House 
Elected to the Senate
New freshman representative 
Died
Retired from the House 
Defeated for reelection to the 
House
Ran for the Senate
Became senior advisor to the
DSPC
^Member of the DSPC also during the Ninety-four 
Congress.
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The Ninety-fifth Congress
In 1977, the DSPC met frequently. By the end of the 
year, thirty-two sessions had taken place. ^  Due to the 
Carter Presidency, the new Speaker, O'Neill, focused most 
meetings on the agenda of the Democratic Party. Further­
more, O'Neill wanted to emerge as an active, forceful leader 
who cooperated with his party's president in order to pass 
Democratic programs.
Nevertheless, because of the early incompetence demon­
strated by the Carter Presidency, the Speaker first 
transformed DSPC gatherings into forums where members could 
air discontent about the new administration. For example, 
on February 8, the DSPC complained to Vice President Mondale 
and White House Congessional Liaison Frank Moore that the 
administration did not provide their intentions on policy 
programs enough in advance to legislators.-^ On June 15, 
Moore returned with Hamilton Jordan and James King, who was 
responsible for the allocation of the president's patronage. 
The DSPC resented the almost total blindness of the White 
House to their patronage needs. Also the representatives 
bemoaned the lack of possibilities to claim credit since the 
executive branch consistently failed to inform congressmen
*4The DSPC met thirteen times in 1973 and then fifteen 
times in 1974.
l^Edward Walsh, "President Hopeful of Good Relations 
with the Hill," Washington P o s t , February 9, 1977, pp. A1 
and A8, cited by Waldman, "Leadership in the House of Rep­
resentatives . . . p. 71.
54
of appointments in their districts. Speaker O ’Neill indi­
cated that Democrats in the House unwillingly adhered to the 
party positions without enough of these incentives.
Second, the Speaker directed the DSPC to give official 
approval to bills that he viewed as salient. One represen­
tative involved downplayed these moves because O ’Neill 
concerned himself with only "motherhood" issues, which pre­
sumably referred to matters like social security, jobs 
programs, etc.l? Then, the Speaker and the DSPC uninten­
tionally diminished their own credibility when these types 
of bills that already had Democratic support were endorsed.
Finally, O'Neill brought the DSPC on the the scene 
only after standing committees had reported out the bills. 
In 1977, he refused to transform this group into an "early 
warning system."18 Yet, the Speaker reversed himself some­
what at the beginning of 1 9 7 8 . O ’Neill established task 
forces, composed of staff and chosen members not necessarily
l ^ O ' N e i l l  prefaced this meeting with "I want you to 
understand that everything that is said will be leaked 
immediately." "House Democrats Say Carter's Patronage Policy 
Saps Party Discipline," New York Times, June 15, 1977, p.
A15; also cited by ibid.
l^Michael J. Malbin, "Congress Report/House Democrats 
Playing With a Strong Leadership Lineup," National Jour­
nal 9 (June 18, 1977): 940.
bid., p . 946.
1 ^ 0 'Neill passed the bulk of Carter's energy program 
largely because of two reasons: the new Speaker still had
many credits out and O'Neill formed an Ad Hoc Committee on 
Energy.
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on the DSPC in order to bolster .the whip organization. This 
development did not surprise many since Irvine Sprague, then 
executive director, possessed first hand knowledge of the 
whip system from his service as administrative assistant to 
John McFall, the former majority whip. Furthermore, O'Neill 
had conspicuously avoided dealing with amendments through 
the DSPC. The introduction and continuation of task forces, 
on the other hand, rectified this deliberate oversight to a
significant degree 20
^ F a c t  sheets have been an added product by the staff 
of the DSPC. These concise summaries, also known as 
bullets, have been usually written prior to floor action on 
bills. They have also been dictated and copied off in an 
Appropriations Committee room near the House floor on un­
expected amendments.
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TABLE 6
DSPC MEMBERSHIP, NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
Of ficers
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (Mass.)
Majority Leader James C. Wright Jr. (Tex.)
Caucus Chairman Thomas S. Foley (Wash.)
Whips
Majority Whip John Brademas (Ind.)
Chief Deputy Whip Dan Rostenkowski (111.)
Deputy Whip William V. Alexander (Ark.)
Deputy Whip George E. Danielson (Calif.)
Deputy Whip Benjamin S. Rosenthal (N.Y.)
Appointed (By The Speaker)
William H. Grey (Pa.), represented freshmen 
Gladys N. Spellman (Md.), represented women 
Charles B. Rangel (N.Y.), represented blacks
Charles G. Rose (N.C.), represented second and third termers
Elected (No. in Region)
# 1: Calif. (25)
# 2: Ariz., Col., Haw.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M.,
Ore., Utah, Wash.,
Wyo. (22)
# 3: Mich., Minn., Wis. (22)
# 4: 111., Ind., K y . (22)
Henry A. Waxman (Calif.)
Robert B. Duncan (Ore.) 
William D. Ford (Mich.) 
Morgan F. Murphy (111.)
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TABLE 6 Continued
# 5: Ark., Ia., Kans.,
Mo., Okla * (20)
# 6: Tex. (20)
# 7: A l a ., Fla., L a .,
Miss. (24)
# 8: Ga., N.C., S.C.,
Tenn. (29)
# 9: M d ., N.J., V a .,
W.Va. (24)
#10: Ohio, Pa. (25)
#11: N.Y. (26)
#12: Conn., D.C., Guam,
M ass., N.H., P.I., 
R.I., V.I. (21) 
Executive Director
Richard Bolling (Mo.) 
Eligio de la Garza (Tex.)
John B. Breaux (La.)
W.G. (Bill Hefner (N.C.)
Robert A. Roe (N.J.) 
John F. Sieberling (Ohio) 
Mario Biaggi (N.Y.)
Fernand J. St Germain (R.I.)
S. Ariel Weiss
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TABLE 7
DSPC NEW PARTICIPANTS, NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
Replacements
Rangel
Spellman
Gray
Duncan
Breaux
Hefner
Ford 
Biaggi 
St Germain 
Sieberling 
Weiss
Previous
Participants
Metcalfe
Jordan
Kostmayer
Meeds
Flowers
Mathis
Obey 
Bingham 
D 'Amours 
Dent 
Sprague
Reason for Leaving 
(If Any)
Died
Retired
New freshman
representative
Retired
Ran for the Senate
Met two term limit (and
retired)
Met two term limit 
Met two term limit 
Met two term limit 
Retired 
Went to FDIC
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The Ninety-sixth Congress
Speaker O'Neill seemingly established even greater 
control of the DSPC in the Ninety-sixth Congress. He named 
one of his legislative assistants, then twenty-five-year-old 
S. Ariel Weiss, as the executive director. O'Neill also 
tried to place loyal Democrats in openings on the Ways and 
Means Committee at the same time.^l
From January 16 through 18, 1979, the Committee on 
Committees shaped the working units of the House. The mem­
bers first nominated Cecil Heftel and James Shannon for 
seats on the Ways and Means Committee.^2 Thereupon, 
haggling commenced for the three remaining positions. 
Finally, in addition to Heftel and Shannon, the Speaker sent 
the names of Thomas J. Downey, Sam B. Hall Jr., and Frank 
Guartini to the caucus. When the rank and file assembled on 
January 23, three congressmen, Wyche Fowler, Ronnie G. 
Flippo, and James L. Oberstar, challenged these decisions. 
Many members in fact expected Oberstar to be one of the 
designees. Nonetheless, one representative on the DSPC 
divulged that: "He didn't campaign vigorously with the
committee members. Its like campaigning for office. • . .
Most of us know he has a good record, but it is always nice
2^-Two of the openings were due to retirements by James 
H. Burke and Omar Burleson.
22shannon wrote his senior thesis at Johns Hopkins on 
the rise of O'Neill to the Speakership.
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to be a s k e d . "23 Q f  -^ he three who objected, only Fowler 
attained a seat by eliminating Hall, even though the latter 
had the support of Majority Leader Wright. However, Fowler 
did comment on why he had won: "It beats the hell out of
m e ."24
Yet another case of opposition soon emerged. James R. 
Jones, a midwestern moderate, desired joint membership on 
the Ways and Means and the Budget Committees. The Speaker 
and the Committee on Committees had not selected him for 
this dual role. Nevertheless, when Jones voiced his inten­
tions within the caucus, the rank and file voted to elimi­
nate the most conservative candidate, Joseph L. Fisher, and 
alternatively to accept J o n e s . 25
More important, Speaker O'Neill put his prestige on 
the line as he verbally rescued Congressman Jamie L. Whitten 
who had been slated for the chairmanship of the Appropria­
tions Committee. O'Neill argued that Whitten, even though 
his record of party support was mixed, deserved the promo­
tion for his honesty.26 The rank and file apparently
23Quoted to Richard E. Cohen, "The Mysterious Way Con­
gress Makes Committee Assignments," National Journal 11 
(February 3, 1979): 83.
24Quoted by ibid., p. 85.
25xhe caucus chose two other members during the 
Ninety-sixth Congress for this double service: William
Brodhead and Richard A. Gephardt.
26Ann Cooper, "Committee Assignments Finished, Chair­
men Picked, Congress is Ready to Work," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (January 27, 1979): 152.
61
listened to their titular leader since Whitten prevailed by 
a wide margin (157-88).
The caucus also lifted the Speaker out of a predica­
ment when it waived the rule that limited members to just 
two seats. Members then filled places on such minor 
committees as District of Columbia and International Rela­
tions without losing assignments to prestigious posts. 
Thus, Speaker O'Neill learned that he could no longer assume 
the cooperation of members nor promise coveted assignments 
for their support. Furthermore, one could logically assume 
that the DSPC in the Ninety-sixth Congress performed some 
action with regard to legislation, but it received no public 
credit for it.
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Summary and Conclusions
The evolution of the DSPC in the Ninety-fourth, 
Ninety-fifth, and Ninety-sixth Congresses depended largely 
on who controlled the group and somewhat less to who sat in 
the White House. It had to deal with first a Republican and 
then a Democratic president. Both individuals indicated a 
desire to work with the DSPC. Nevertheless, Ford failed to 
achieve accommodation largely because of philosophical 
differences. Carter fell short because of sheer oversights. 
The party affiliation of the chief executive thus had little 
effect on the DSPC.
The divergent styles of Speakers made a considerable 
difference on the DSPC. Speaker Albert, who avoided 
presuring individuals, exhibited an obliging nature. 
O'Neill relied on more personal and frequent communication 
with his fellow liberals in the House. As the DSPC adapted 
to the different mannerisms, it became chaotic.
The rejection of the seniority system by the Committee 
on Committees in the Ninety-fourth Congress did not 
necessarily prove helpful. At least strong committee chair­
men could have theoretically helped the Speaker guide pro­
grams through the House. Of course, Albert might have 
orchestrated the removal of Poage, Hebert, and Patman if he 
perceived them as threats. More likely, he favored their 
retention because chairmen could serve as partners in the 
legislative process. Nonetheless, opposing views in both 
the Committee on Committees and the caucus forced the
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disposal of the three committee chairmen. Hence, the modi­
fication of voting procedures destroyed a great deal of 
authority that the DSPC would find difficult to replace.
The lack of followership became especially true in the 
Ninety-sixth Congress. Speaker O'Neill chose a new execu­
tive director for the DSPC, but he could not place a party 
loyalist on the Ways and Means Committee. Votes by the cau­
cus, which overturned several nominations by the Committee 
on Committees in this period, limited the power of the 
Speaker. He could not realistically promise influential 
positions in return for support on the House floor.
The DSPC seemingly contributed to the maiden passage 
of a jobs program bill when it presured Mahon to report the 
legislation. Nevertheless, considerable consensus within 
the party also surrounded the issue. In addition, this 
thesis highlighted the fact that members of the DSPC saw 
their role as limited. That is to say, the representatives 
generally did not lobby for programs.
The DSPC did provide a forum for Democrats in the 
House to work out their differences. Yet O'Neill could not 
initially strike a bargain on the energy issue. He had to 
call in many political markers to pull Carter's energy pro­
posals through the ad hoc committee, not the DSPC. Also the 
controversial nature of the ethics reform legislation con­
strained the DSPC. Its resolution to provide the Speaker 
greater control over the House Administration Committee
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failed in the caucus. The DSPC could not reconcile the egos 
of members as well as the trait of protecting one's turf.
The caucus apparently wanted strong leadership since 
efforts to weaken the influence of the Speaker over the com­
position of the DSPC did not prosper. The opposite seemed 
to occur when the Committee on Committees gained control of 
all Democratic nominations to the Budget Committee. Despite 
greater potential on the surface, this move held only margi­
nal value because the rank and file maintained veto power 
over the designees.
In addition, some observers could question the degree 
to which O ’Neill molded the DSPC between the Ninety-fifth 
and Ninety-sixth Congresses into a tool for the passage of 
legislation. The grievance sessions with individuals from 
the White House simply enabled members on the DSPC to con­
sider themselves far more important than they actually were. 
Younger members must have enjoyed serving as part of the 
leadership. Those critics with a discerning eye should ask 
if this development made any difference to the Speaker.
Task forces on salient bills provided O'Neill somewhat 
more flexibility in his daily functions. But two points 
should be remembered. First, most members refused to 
support these operations on a regular basis. Second, except 
for the Speaker, representatives on the DSPC have not neces­
sarily been involved in the task forces. Therefore, the 
chance of building followership through repeated service has 
been limited.
CHAPTER IV
THE DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND POLICY COMMITTEE 
IN THE NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
Introduction
This thesis has heretofore highlighted the DSPC. 
Instead the following chapter will treat its dynamics in 
detail during the Ninety-seventh Congress. First, the rules 
and the new membership will be considered. Then, the 
functions of the DSPC over this two year period will be 
assessed. Laconically, committee assignments will be cited. 
More important, the activities of the group with regard to 
the budget will be appraised. Ideological passions within 
the DSPC, in lieu of substantive discussions, also will be 
mentioned.
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The First Session
The 1980 election of a Republican to the White Rouse 
could have propelled Speaker O'Neill and the DSPC into an 
active, independent legislative role. But, the large number 
of conservative Republicans brought into the House on
Reagan’s coattails changed the composition of the chamber. 
Furthermore, the Democratic Caucus altered the makeup of the 
DSPC.
Even though Richard Bolling already served four years 
as a regional representative, O'Neill wanted his old friend 
and confidant to stay on the DSPC for yet another term. Dan 
Rostenkowski fell into a similar predicament. He did not 
want to leave upon becoming chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee. In order to avoid conflict with the two consecu­
tive term limitation rule, the Speaker asked the caucus to
include the chairmen of the Ways and Means, Rules (where 
Bolling assumed control), Appropriations, and Budget Commit­
tees on the DSPC. By making allowances for influential 
committee chairmen, as well as the head of the Congressional 
Campaign Committee, Speaker O'Neill convinced the rank and 
file that he could maneuver legislation through the House
more easily.*
In addition, the rules of the DSPC restricted the 
length of service by deputy whips. The caucus did not
*The size of the DSPC increased to twenty-nine with 
these five additions.
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alter this limitation that ran out in the Ninety-seventh 
Congress. While a separate whip organization functioned, 
the rank and file believed it a useless undertaking to load 
the DSPC with them. The caucus did provide the chief deputy 
whip a seat with non-voting status as a compromise. Yet 
Speaker O'Neill insisted that more whips be included. Thus, 
he appointed a deputy whip, J. Joseph Moakley, and several 
at large whips on the DSPC in order to communicate better
with members.^
The procedures of the DSPC established a framework 
(See Table 10); they disclosed little about the performance 
of the group. Committee assignments, which surfaced as the 
first major task in the Ninety-seventh Congress, revealed 
more about the rationale behind decisions of Speaker O'Neill 
as well as the dynamics of the DSPC. For example, one 
southern representatative believed too few conservative 
Democrats held important seats and maintained: "On some
crucial committees, which involved tobacco and things like 
that, we may feel that the membership is a bit one sided, 
the other w a y . "3 Another member truly enjoyed his service 
on the DSPC and indicated:
Anyone can say that I nominated you (during the
Committee on Committees), but to try to deal
^Region #5 elected another deputy whip, Richard A. 
Gephardt. Also during the Ninety-seventh Congress, the 
following members of the DSPC doubled as at large whips: 
Tony Coehlo, Patricia Schroeder, Tom Bevill, Norman Y. 
Mineta, and John P. Murtha.
^Confidential source.
TABLE 8
DSPC MEMBERSHIP, NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
Of f icers
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (Mass.)
Majority Leader James C. Wright Jr. (Tex.)
Caucus Chairman Gillis W. Long (La.)
Members
Majority Whip Thomas S. Foley (Wash.)
Secy, to the Caucus Geraldine A. Ferraro (N.Y.) 
Appropriations Committee Chairman Jamie L. Whitten (Miss 
Rules Committee Chairman Richard Bolling (Mo.)
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (111. 
Budget Committee Chairman James R. Jones (Okla.) 
Non-voting members
Chief Deputy Whip William V. Alexander (Ark.)
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman 
Tony Coelho (Calif.)
Appointed (By The Speaker)
Patricia Schroeder (Col.) represented women
Charles B. Rangel (N.Y.), represented blacks
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin (La.) represented freshmen
Wyche Fowler (Ga.), represented second and third termers
Tom Bevill (Ala.)
Wes Watkins (Okla.)
J. Joseph Moakley (Mass.)
Norman Y. Mineta (Calif.)
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TABLE 8
Elected (No. in Region) 
ft 1: Calif. (22)
ft 2: Amer. Soma, Ariz.,
Col., Guam, Haw., Mont.,
Nev., Ore., Wash. (20)
ft 3: Mich., Minn., Wis. (20)
ft 4: 111. , Ind. , K y . (17)
ft 5: Ark., Ia., Kan., Mo.,
N . D . , Okla. S.D. (19) 
ft 6: Tex. (19)
ft 7: A l a . , Fl a . , L a .,
Miss. (23) 
ft 8: G a . , N . C . , S.C.,
Tenn. (23) 
ft 9: M d . , N . J . , Va. ,
W.Va. (17)
#10: Ohio, Pa. (23)
#11: N.Y. (22)
#12: Conn., D.C., Mass.,
N.H. , P.I. , R.I. ,
V.I. (19)
Continued
Phillip Burton (Calif.)
Timothy E. Wirth (Col.) 
William D. Ford (Mich.) 
Adam Benjamin Jr. (Ind.)
Richard A. Gephardt (Mo.) 
Charles Wilson (Tex.)
John B. Breaux (La.)
W.G. (Bill) Hefner (N.C.)
William J. Hughes (N.J.) 
John P. Murtha (Pa.) 
Mario Biaggi (N.Y.)
Fernand J. St Germain (R.I.)
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TABLE 9
DSPC NEW PARTICIPANTS, NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
Replacements
Long
Foley'
Bolling
Rostenkowski *
Whi tten
Jones
Ferraroa
Alexander
Coehlo
Moakley
Schroeder
Bevill
Mineta
Previous
Participants
Foley
Brademas
Rostenkowski
Spellman
Reason for Leaving 
(If Any)
Met two term limit 
Defeated for reelection 
to the House
Did not recover from 
heart attack
^Members of the DSPC also during the Ninety-sixth Con-
G r e s s •
aFerraro persuaded her colleagues that the DSPC under­
represented women. Through this argument, she gained a seat 
for herself.
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TABLE 9 Continued
Replacements Previous
Participants
Reason for Leaving 
(If Any)
Fowler0
Benj amin 
Tauzinc
Watkins^
Burton
Wirth
Hughes
Ginn
Murphy
Grey
Waxman
Duncan
Roe
Candidate for governor 
of G a .
Retired from the House 
New freshman 
representative
Met two term limit 
Met two term limit 
Met two term limit
^Fowler actually replaced Ronald (Bo) Ginn in January
1982. After Ginn announced his candidacy for governor of
Georgia, Speaker O'Neill asked Ginn to relinquish his posi­
tion on the DSPC before the end of the Ninety-seventh Con­
gress.
cEven though Tauzin joined the House through a
special (May 1980) election, six months before the normal
date, he represented freshmen on the DSPC.
^Watkins successfully lobbied for a place on the DSPC 
in order to ensure a seat on the Appropriations Committee 
for himself.
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TABLE 10
DSPC PROCEDURES, NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
Rule 1. Meeting Dates
a. The Committee shall meet on call of the Chairman, 
at least twice a month.
b. The Chairman shall also call additional meetings 
if requested to do so in writing by four or more members of 
the Committee.
c. Meetings shall be presided over by the Chairman,
and in the absence of the Chairman by the Vice Chariman, and
in the absence of both by the Second Vice Chairman.
d. The Chairman may cancel any meeting for cause.
RULE 2. Agenda
The Chairman shall be responsible for the preparation 
of the agenda. In addition to matters he designates as
agenda time, other items may be placed on the agenda by any
member of the Committee by notifying the Chairman in writing 
at least 48 hours before the meeting.
RULE 3. Quorum
A majority of the members of the Committee shall cons­
titute a quorum.
RULE 4. Journal
The Committee shall keep a journal of its proceedings.
RULE 5. Attendance
No persons, except Democratic members of the House of 
Representatives and staff of the Committee, shall be 
admitted to meetings of the Committee without express per­
mission of the Chairman.
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TABLE 10— Continued 
RULE 6. Ad Hoc Committees
The Chairman may appoint ad hoc committees from among 
the entire membership of the Democratic Caucus to conduct 
special studies and investigation. The Committee may also 
authorize the use of Committee staff to assist the ad hoc 
committees.a
aRules adopted by the Democratic Caucus, December 9,
1980.
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with someone from California or somebody with a 
different philosophy other than your own, to get 
your man elected over his, to come up with the 
right number of votes within the right number of 
ballots, it is truly a political insight on how 
Congress operates.4
Both comments conspicuously avoided mention of any 
direct involvement by O'Neill; yet he moved behind the 
scenes. The Speaker correctly saw the Ways and Means 
Committee as an initial testing ground for the new presi­
dent. Hence the Committee on Committees shaped the seats in 
a two-to-one ratio of Democrats to Republicans even through 
the 1980 election returned a House with a two party propor­
tion of five-to-four. S. Ariel Weiss, the executive
director of the DSPC, justified this incongruence as 
historical precedence. When the Republicans held the
majority, he indicated that their leaders were found 
"guilty" of the same gambit.®
As a gesture of compromise representatives who did not 
customarily applaud the Speaker received influential posi­
tions.® For example, the caucus approved the nomination of 
Phil Gramm, a former economics professor from Texas, to the
4Confidential source.
^Quoted to David S. Broder, "Republicans Will Disrupt 
House, Angry Elder Vows," Washington Post, January 3, 1981, 
p . A6.
®Two Conservative Democratic Forum congressmen, Ronald 
(Bo) Ginn and Tom Bevill, held Appropriations subcommittee 
chairmanships. Ginn oversaw Military Construction and 
Bevill directed Energy and Water. Both members also served 
on the DSPC.
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Budget Committee.^ His actions with regard to the budget, 
as a matter of fact, evolved into a major preoccupation of 
the Speaker and the DSPC. Later in the session, they would 
question whether or not Gramm and those like him should 
remain on prestigious committees.
The Budget and the DSPC
On February 18, 1981, President Reagan promised before 
a joint session of Congress cuts of $41.1 billion in the 
1982 fiscal spending and reductions in personal and business 
taxes of $53.9 billion. Speaker O'Neill and members of the 
DSPC the next day listened to Alice Rivlin, the director of 
the Congressional Budget Office, and Joseph Peckman, an 
economist from the Brookings Institution, explain the tight 
monetary policy of the Federal Reserve B o a r d . H  On March 5, 
economists Robert Hartman and Otto Eckstein reviewed tradi­
tional Keynesian philosophy. Bowman Cutter, a former 
associate director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
economist Henry Aaron, of Brookings, and pollster Peter Hart 
discussed the same topic with the Speaker and the DSPC soon 
afterwards. Walter Heller, the chairman of the Council of
^Gramm joined other Conservative Democratic Forum mem­
bers, Beryl Anthony Jr., W.G. (Bill) Hefner, and William 
Nelson on the Budget Committee.
11-On the evening of February 19, the vice chairman of 
the DSPC, James C. Wright Jr., appeared in a televised 
address with Senators Hart and Chiles to attack Republican 
economic proposals as unsound.
76
Economic Advisors during the Kennedy and Johnson administra­
tions, appeared before members on March 31.
Speaker O'Neill introduced a statement after the 
briefings for the DSPC to consider. But another caucus 
group, the Committee on Party Effectiveness, composed the 
"Democratic Economic Principles," the paper that the members 
reviewed. Immediately a Boll Weevil attacked the document 
as "communistic.1,12 Despite the hostile reception, O'Neill 
oversaw an affirmative vote of the precepts. In association 
with these pages, which were sheer rhetoric, Budget Commit­
tee Chairman Jones, released detailed proposals also sanc­
tioned by the Speaker on the same day.
Later in April, the Speaker kept the DSPC out the 
budget negotiations between the president and the House 
leadership.12 O'Neill could make such a decision, but it 
indicated an admission. He conceded that the presence of 
the organization would not have helped forge an acceptable 
budget agreeable to all.
The Speaker did try to establish the DSPC as a leader­
ship assembly with the Business Roundtable. He still could 
not reach agreement between the general philosophical 
opposites of business executives and the Democratic leaders,
l^Confidential source.
l^Weiss also participated in these talks; O'Neill said 
at the beginning of April "I've been one of the big spenders 
of all time." Quoted by Margot Hornblower, "O'Neill Thinks 
Democrats' Timing on Budget May be Off," Washington P o s t , 
April 8, 1981, p. A4.
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especially since he had competitors on the DSPC. For 
instance, Dan Rostenkowski hinted that Speaker O'Neill was 
stubborn in utterances like "Tip stands there like an oak 
because he's got bascially a liberal chemistry. . . ."14
James R. Jones basked in attention from the rank and file 
because he controlled the influential Budget Committee. One 
knowledgeable individual on the staff of the leadership 
admitted that due to the office that Jones occupied, "mem­
bers kissed his ass and not the Speaker' s . Furthermore,
ranking members of the DSPC such as James C. Wright and 
Thomas S. Foley contributed to the confusion by positioning 
themselves early to become the next Speaker.
In this disorderly environment, O'Neill assembled the 
DSPC to plan strategy before the budget reconciliation, 
Reagan's proposal to cut programs by $35 billion. When the 
vote occurred, however, this group provided no help. More­
over, three members of the DSPC, Tauzin, Breaux, and Wilson, 
included themselves among those who sided with the presi­
dent.
Breaux credited his stand with constituents who 
solidly believed in the administration and its policies "to 
bring back fiscal s a n i t y . O n  the other hand Wilson
1^Quoted by Martin Schram, "Leading the Democrats," 
Washington P o s t , June 8, 1981, p. A 1 .
l^Confidential source.
^ Q u o t e d  by Margot Hornblower and T.R. Reid, "After 
Two Decades, The Boll Weevils Are Back Whistling Dixie," 
Washington Post, April 26, 1981, P. A10.
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expressed some remorse for his actions. After the recon­
ciliation vote. He offered to leave the DSPC, but the Spea­
ker did not accept Wilson's resignation. O'Neill would not 
(and could not at this time) really punish Phil Gramm, a 
ringleader of the revolt. Thus, no reason existed for the 
Speaker to chastise Wilson, a member who supported Demo­
cratic leaders most of the time but united with Gramm on 
this one i s s u e . ^  Embarrassment also lessened any chance 
for revenge. First, Wilson and Wright worked diligently to 
get Gramm nominated to the Budget Committee. Second, Wilson 
sat with the DSPC largely because of the efforts of Wright. 
Finally, on the House floor, members remembered Wilson's 
nominating address of Wright for the position of majority 
leader. Lest one not forget, Wright won that post by a 
single vote.
Therefore, factors outside the control of the Speaker 
restrained the ability of O'Neill to use the DSPC in the 
first part of 1981. He then withdrew the group into 
official hibernation for the August recess. This hiatus 
ended in September when O'Neill summoned the DSPC to 
authorize waivers on three pending bills; Honorary U.S. 
citizenship for Raoul Wallenburg, the Swedish diplomat who 
diverted Hungarian Jews from Nazi concentration camps; the 
U.S. tour of the Springboks (the National Rugby Team of 
South Africa); and Reauthorization for the Office of Envi­
ronmental Quality.
l^Wilson later opposed the Reagan tax cut.
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At this juncture, the Speaker attempted to reach be­
yond mere administrative functions. He tacitly granted 
absolution to Democrats who earlier had renounced party 
positions on the budget and the tax votes. Furthermore, 
O'Neill notified conservatives in his party that the DSPC 
would only sanction occasional defections in the future, not 
frequent desertions. Ideologues hoped that the Speaker 
would relegate Boll Weevils to minor committees. O'Neill 
instead agreed to reward congressmen who champion his views 
with prestigious assignments.
Soon afterwards, the death of Representative William 
R. Cotter instituted the aforementioned plan. Three mem­
bers, Michael Lowry, Geraldine Ferraro, and Beryl Anthony 
Jr. competed for the seat Cotter vacated on the Ways and 
Means Committee. Anthony voted with the president on the 
first Reagan budget. The Committee on Committees still 
selected him for the position with the promise that he 
strongly support the Speaker hereafter.18 yet such
l**Anthony had not been a frequent deserter from Demo­
cratic programs. He registered a party unity score for the 
Ninety-sixth Congress of 63.5 per cent, just two points 
lower than the party average. Congressional Quarterly Alma­
nac 1979; pp. 32-3, 1980, pp. 33-4c. One administrative
assistant, who forgot about Anthony's appointment, stated 
naively to me:
"The Steering and Policy Committee is a powerful 
tool of the leadership. If a guy goes against a 
Rostenkowski tax bill and then says 'Do you 
think this kills my chance of getting on the 
Ways and Means Committee?' What do you think?
. . . Service, just like the Speaker did, is
part of paying your dues!" (Confidential 
source.)
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prerequisites did not affect Gramm. He would still do as he 
wished, which included planning with President Reagan 
against Speaker O'Neill.
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January 6 
January 7 
January 28 
February 5 
February 19
March 5
March 19
March 31 
April 7
May 20 
June 4 
June 22 
September 16
September 23 
October 6 
November 19
TABLE 11
DSPC MEETINGS, FIRST SESSION (1981)
First meeting on the Committee on Committees
Second meeting on the Committee on Committees
To fill remaining committee vacancies
Committee vacancies
Alice Rivlan 
Joseph Peckman
Robert Hartman 
Otto Eckstein
Bowman Cutter 
Henry Aaron 
Peter Hart
Fill vacancies and Walter Heller as guest
Fill vacancies and consider proposed Democra­
tic Economic Principles
Business Roundtable
Brief meeting for committee vacancies 
Budget Reconciliation
Fill vacancies, discuss the budget and waivers 
on suspension bills
Fill vacancies
Fill vacancies
Committee assignment for Wayne Dowdy (Miss.) 
and Agriculture vacancy
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The Second Session
By 1982, even some close friends of the DSPC saw it as 
increasingly ineffective, O'Neill attempted to oppose the 
Reagan administration with resolutions calling Democratic 
unity, but he was unsuccessful. Thus, the Speaker entrusted 
this assembly with mere administrative tasks.
When conducting research during the second session, I 
learned from several staff members on the DSPC that 1981 and 
1982 had been frustrating. At this point, O'Neill seldom 
asked for meetings. One individual summed up the predica­
ment as follows:
What is the point of meeting to endorse legisla­
tion which the House, much less the Congress, 
isn't going to pass? We would look foolish 
passing a bunch of resolutions saying that the 
Congress should do this or that all Democrats 
should vote this way. We would march out to the 
(House) floor and be trampled by our own 
troops.
When the Speaker wanted to confer with the DSPC, some 
representatives did not attend on a regular basis. The con­
gressmen who did arrive clashed in ideological warfare. 
"Just getting mad at people is not what the leadership 
needs," confessed one observer.1® Another legislative 
strategist lamented his daily routine:
It is not very exciting. I go over and I sit 
through a hearing. . . .  I find out how people 
are behaving on a particular bill . . . and how 
we are going to get it to the floor in the shape
^confidential source.
^confidential source.
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that will be politically useful in the next 
election. . . . It's not interesting and
nothing may come of it. Ninety percent of our 
time is spent doing this kind of stuff (not
committee assignments) .
Hence, O'Neill gave the group even less responsi­
bility. In February, the DSPC performed the dubious 
function of selecting congressional delegates for the Mid- 
Term Convention, a Democratic forum held in late June to 
address relevant issues. Nonetheless, Speaker O'Neill did 
use one meeting to review the work of various task forces in 
the House. In the end, he assigned Richard Bolling the dis­
putable honor of coordinating their activities.
The Speaker then just arranged for spokesmen to 
address the DSPC in the remainder of the session. Governor 
Edmund G. Brown Jr. of California discussed the prospects 
for "New Federalism." O'Neill also included a few more lec­
turers in economics: Felix Rohaytn, a senior partner of
Lazard Frere investment banking firm, and Michael Blumen- 
thal, the former Secretary of the Treasury. Throughout the 
year, in addition, the Speaker and the Committee on 
Committees filled committee vacancies as needed.
20Con fidential source.
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TABLE 12
DSPC MEETINGS, SECOND SESSION (as of 7/15/82)
February 1
February 10 
February 23 
March 9
May 18
Committee assignments and discuss delegates 
for Mid-Term Conference
Policy Task Force meeting
Governor Brown
Felix Bohaytn 
Michael Blumenthal
George W. Crocket Jr., (Mich.) resignation
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Summary and Conclusions
Conclusions have already been included in the last few 
pages, but let us again review the facts. First, the mem­
bership of the DSPC became more southern in its composition. 
Two Boll Weevils, Breaux and Hefner, already served with the 
group. Speaker O'Neill appointed some more conservative 
Democrats, Bevill, Tauzin, Watkins, and Fowler in an effort 
to paper over differences within the party. Yet, the 
Speaker could not erase the divisions. Boll Weevils still 
tried to draw O'Neill away from extreme liberal viewpoints. 
Similarly, O'Neill attempted to use these individuals as 
conduits to moderates in the party. Both segments found it 
impossible to reach an accommodation.
Second, many whips returned to the DSPC even though 
the caucus officially removed them. Apparently Speaker 
O'Neill considered participation by whips as beneficial, a 
means to communicate further with members. It was also 
believed that they also counted and mobilized legislative 
support.
Third, the Speaker realized that particularly impor­
tant chairmen with the DSPC might enable him to coordinate 
better legislation. On the other hand, O'Neill also had to 
confront a considerably larger and more diverse group. That 
is to say, cohesion weakened. Democratic lieutenants 
exposed themselves as rivals; Wright, Rostenkowski, and 
Jones tried to steal the limelight. Furthermore, political 
maneuvering only served to fuel dissension within Democratic
86
ranks. Several members of the DSPC actually joined the 
president during the budget battle. This fact must have 
reinforced in the mind of the Speaker the supreme commitment 
of representative to constituent. Thus, O'Neill's attempt 
to use an ideologically diverse DSPC as an aid in consensus 
building and commumications basically backfired.
Finally, in the policy area, the DSPC encountered 
formidable opposition from other committees. The budget 
remained the number one topic in the Ninety-seventh Con­
gress. Subsequently, the Committee on the Budget deemed it­
self a more legitimate leadership organization than the 
DSPC. Moreover, the Committee on Party Effectiveness tried 
to assume the role of policy inititiator for the caucus.
To put it kindly, the DSPC performed as a jack- 
of-all-trades during the past two years; others could say 
that it aimlessly searched for a suitable role. The DSPC 
served as a club where members sarcastically refined their 
debating skills. As part of the majority, the group also 
fulfilled clerical duties like scheduling bills under sus­
pension. Yet the House Administration Committee could have 
executed this task. In some instances, Speaker O'Neill used 
the DSPC as a sounding board, and hoped that new ideas would 
coincide with his own. He brought many guest speakers to 
Capitol Hill in an effort to educate congressmen. But did 
briefings help O'Neill pass legislation? Of course, the 
gatherings might have been interesting —  to college 
interns•
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Despite misgivings, credit should be given. The staff 
of the DSPC kept O'Neill abreast of the work of committees 
while groping toward a unified Democratic approach. Behind 
the scenes, the qualified among these employees often 
doubled as the eyes and ears of the Speaker.
In the future, the DSPC as the Committee on Committees 
might not reassign Gramm to the Budget Committee. If the 
group made him a sacrificial lamb, a more unified party 
would not necessarily result. The punishment of Gramm would 
serve as just an extreme example. The Speaker also knows 
that taking on the whole southern tier with the Democratic 
majority in the Ninety-seventh Congress would translate into 
his immediate dismissal. A considerable number of northern, 
liberal Democrats elected to the next Congress would upset 
this balance.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Democratic Party in the House has been weak for 
decades. Speakers John W. McCormack and Carl Albert did not 
inherit Rayburn's gift for leadership. O'Neill came into 
office with a desire to serve as a forceful leader like Ray­
burn, but the post-reform House resisted strong leadership. 
As a result of changes, a multitude of subcommittee chairmen 
held power instead of a few committee chairmen. Since 
influence was dispersed a Democratic Caucus also vied with 
the Speaker for the role of party leader. The list of addi­
tional command centers encompassed almost every 
congressional group. Therein lay the problem; reforms had
decentralized power in the House to the extreme. The ques­
tion remained whether if anyone could pick up the pieces.
It is my conclusion that the Speaker has been unable to con­
solidate the fragmented power structure in the House.
According to a popular conception, the Speaker osten­
sibly led his party. Yet the House, unlike the executive
branch, did not religiously implement his orders. Speakers, 
at least recent ones, have not been rulers. they served at 
the will of the membership that elected them. Furthermore, 
the Speaker did not always dramatically influence 
legislation. Possibly he did not want to jeopardize his
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prestige. The issue perhaps could have simply not warranted 
the extra effort. Quite feasibly, the Speaker trusted the 
ability of democratic process to produce the best kind of 
result.
When I questioned key Democrats, many could not answer 
a why the caucus reorganized the DSPC. From the records, 
one could conclude that this organization should have 
induced a more cohesive party. An increase in Democratic 
unity took place from the Ninety-second Congress, the pre- 
DSPC era, to subsequent Congresses. But just because one 
event occurred after another, it did not necessarily mean 
that the first caused the second. Too many other possible 
explanations existed for the change in voting behavior such 
as a trend independent of the DSPC.
If one wanted to find the beginnings of greater party 
responsibility, the DSPC would not serve as the place to 
look. During the last two Congresses, representatives on 
the DSPC averaged almost exactly equal to their peers in 
party unity scores (see Table 13). In fact, members on the 
DSPC voted significantly higher than the Democratic norm for 
only two out of the five last Congresses. One could attri­
bute lower party scores among congressmen on the DSPC to 
its unstable composition. Over half of the representatives, 
thirteen in the Ninety-fourth Congress, had no previous 
experience. In the next two Congresses, this number 
decreased to nine and then ten new members. Finally, the 
total returned to thirteen for the Ninety-seventh Congress.
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TABLE 13
PARTY UNITY SCORES
Ninety-first Congress8- 
Ninety-second Congress9- 
Ninety-third Congress*5 
Ninety-fourth Congress0 
Ninety-fifth Congress^ 
Ninety-sixth Congresse 
Ninety-seventh Congress^
DSPC
66%
73
72
64.5
66%
Democratic
Party
59.5%
59.5
65.5 
68
67.5
65.5 
66%
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac; (a) 1975, p.
984; (b)1973, pp. 960-1. Scores based on the Ninety-second
Congress with Speaker Albert and freshman Owens omitted (c) 
1975, pp. 984-5. Scores based on the Ninety-third Congress 
with Speaker Albert and freshmen Brodhead and D'Amours 
omitted; (d) 1976, pp. 1000-1. Scores based on the Ninety- 
fourth Congress with Speaker O'Neill and freshman Kostmayer 
omitted; (e) 1978, pp. 32-3c. Scores based on Ninety-fifth 
Congress with Speaker O'Neill and freshman Grey omitted; (f) 
1979, p. 32-3c, 1980 pp. 33-4c. Scores based on the Ninety- 
sixth Congress with Speaker O'Neill and freshman Tauzin 
omitted.
91
Therefore, one could assume that the inconsistent and often 
tempermental membership hurt the chances for the DSPC to 
fashion a coherent organizational strategy and to instill 
greater party responsibility.
Several state delegations and the congressional black 
caucus consistently also obtained through appointment and 
automatic seats greater representation than originally 
allotted them. Despite elaborate procedures for participa­
tion, the DSPC then exhibited a distorted geographic har­
mony, Subsequently, coalitions formed that detracted from 
and restrained Speakers Albert and O'Neill.
Breakdown In the Legislative Process
On issues like social security the leadership could 
not afford a defeat because of the link to Democratic core 
constituencies. The DPSC thus attempted to marshal support 
on salient bills for the Speaker. Nevertheless, most 
observers and participants thought that resolutions from the 
DSPC, which tried to enforce the significance of certain 
programs, had little effect on the House floor. A majority 
of liberals complained that policy statements were too 
watered down. An entirely different problem surfaced parti­
cularly under a Democratic president. O'Neill considered 
too many bills crucial party votes; eventually, members grew 
selectively deaf to his pleas. Quite the opposite situation 
occurred in the Ninety-seventh Congress. The Speaker deli­
berately kept controversial issues away from the DSPC.
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Perhaps he finally realized that enunciations from them made 
only a marginal difference. The staff of the DSPC instead 
kept bills that O'Neill found desirable reasonably well on 
track.
The DSPC formed legislation in its early years. Under 
the aegis of Speaker Albert, this work could take place with 
committee chairmen. A dearth of true prerogatives and the 
number of influential subcommittee chairmen handcuffed 
Speaker O'Neill. In their quest to distribute power in the 
House, liberals chastised the seniority system, but they 
evidently failed to think of viable alternatives.
The DSPC tried to recapture some influence for the 
Speaker. Naturally, standing committees fought to maintain 
the role of policy initiators. For example, the Budget 
Committee revealed itself as a rival to the DSPC. In addi­
tion, the Committee on Party Effectiveness adopted the Demo­
cratic proposals based on the recent House task force 
reports as its own. Then the caucus chairman claimed the 
credit, not the Speaker.
Committee Assignments
Still, the House has generally not been able to enact 
many of its own programs. When restructured in 1973, the 
DSPC could have broken this condrundrum since new indivi­
duals gathered with the Speaker. But no obligation existed 
to go along. Above all, the Speaker controlled no real 
reward for the party faithful until the caucus solidified
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the Committee on Committees in his hands. After this acqui­
sition, Albert and later O'Neill seemingly held a tangible 
means to build favors with respect to future legislation.
Nonetheless, authority over committee assignments did 
not significantly increase the power of Speaker. First, 
Albert and O'Neill chose not to use this tool extensively. 
The same comment could not be made of the remaining members 
of the DSPC. Not surprisingly, congressmen expressed a 
desire to join the group long before the organizational cau­
cus. They obviously wanted to dole out seats and to 
collect political support. In particular, Majority Leader 
Wright furthered his candidacy to serve as the next Speaker 
through service on the DSPC. Representatives from Texas 
traditionally received coveted seats largely through the 
efforts of James C. Wright Jr.; probably they would repay 
him in the eventual election to succeed O'Neill. Members 
other than the Speaker have thus benefited from service on 
the Committee on Committees.
Second, any utility derived from committee nominations 
has been limited because to the caucus managed the last word 
on designees. Hence the Speaker could not guarantee seats 
as "plums." The rank and file have held this dividend ever 
since the upheaval instigated predominately by the Freshmen 
Class of 1974. Finally, one could argue reasonably well 
that activities in the district have been more lucrative at 
the polls than most committee assignments. In this case, the
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Speaker could not have profited from control of the Commit­
tee on Committees even if he used it more.
This structure did open up the major committees to 
greater potential influence by the Speaker. Yet democratic 
ideologues wanted to take the advance one step further. 
They insisted that party members receiving prestigious
assignments doggedly pursue Democratic policies or else the
key seats would be allotted to loyalists.
The Speaker could not realistically grant this dream.
To begin with, O'Neill and the Committee on Committees have 
regularly deprived precious few representatives of chosen 
seats, especially those who accumulated any relative degree 
of seniority. Moreover, the Speaker avoided seeking revenge 
on individuals for desertions on the House floor because he 
did not want to alienate them further. Thus, Phil Gramm 
acted as a fulcrum for conservative elements but remained on 
the Budget Committee. He argued that voting the wishes of 
his district were more important than Democratic unity. 
Ultimately, this reasoning could weaken any amount of party 
devotion.
The number of strong supporters of the Speaker on cer­
tain committees actually might have decreased since 1975. 
From observing a dwindling camp of northerners on the 
Commerce Committee, one could still not deduce that the 
Speaker failed to make his intentions known on the Committee 
on Committees. Such a conclusion would be ridiculously 
biased and totally unwarranted due to Albert and O'Neill’s
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strategic use of the caucus to name the few truly enthusias­
tic party loyalists to carefully designed committees. But a 
question posed an extremely difficult test: did the
proteges remain steadfast to their mentors? One would need 
the following information in order to find the answer: the
legislation of each committee, the stand of the Speaker, and 
who he believed would help or hurt. Various staff of Spea­
ker O'Neill swore without making exact calculations that 
Democratic loyalty increased on the whole since the transfer 
of the committee assignment task. I would probably agree, 
even though no one could be sure how much of a change has 
taken place.
Recently, committee nominations have survived as the 
main role of the DSPC. Speaker O'Neill ignored the produc­
tion of resolutions and extensive policy making, earlier 
occupations, for substantially the same reason - 
- frustration. Despite these setbacks, the Speaker slightly 
expanded the province of the DSPC. For the Carter adminis­
tration, O'Neill introduced what basically appeared as "rap" 
sessions. Under President Reagan, he sought advice from 
Democrats out of power.
Possibly, Speaker O'Neill did not recognize an effec­
tive route for he DSPC to take. The organization often ran 
this way: O'Neill would call five meetings within the span
of just twelve days, filling up the calendars of members. 
Then all of a sudden, the Speaker did not schedule a 
conference for almost two months. When O ’Neill thought that
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the DSPC could make a contribution, he consulted the repre­
sentatives. Nevertheless, such irregularity did not allow 
effectiveness to be acquired or reciprocity to be 
established with other committees.
Hope for of the DSPC as a type of grounding system may 
have overlooked a sober fact: nearly every Democrat
considered himself sole possessor of worthwhile knowledge. 
The Speaker evaluated and sometimes consumed outside points 
of view because of the DSPC. But the group failed to quench 
completely a desire by the rank and file to be constantly 
consulted. By parleying in a committee normally denied to 
other members, certain congressmen gave themselves a false 
sense of aggrandizement. That is to say, the DSPC simply 
assured a handful of not necessarily distinguished congress­
men a forum where they could vent angers.
The DSPC naturally heard various opinions en route to 
the lofty objective of consensus. Communication has been 
its foundation. In addition, creative programs could have 
resulted from these discussions had the two term service 
limitation not forced such high turnover. A lack of 
permanence induced many participants not to provide the DSPC 
with undivided attention. Then, the restriction did not 
satisfy the needs of congressmen’s egos. Moreover, reserved 
seats did not appease minorities. On controversial issues 
like the budget, blacks as well as southern Democrats still 
voted against the Speaker.
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The format of the DSPC maintained a steady rotation of 
conservative and liberal members, inherent factions within 
the party. This interchange guarded against the establish­
ment of one ideological position. But the consequence, 
rather than producing a compromise position all would agree 
to, instead displeased both factions. Boll Weevils deplored 
the positions adopted as too radical while left wing repre­
sentatives complained that the measures did not go far 
enough. Nevertheless, liberals just achieved party sanc­
tions for wayward voting congressmen. Speaker O ’Neill 
realized that the DSPC could not logically crack the whip 
because the Democratic party included almost the whole spec­
trum of political philosophy. Thus, O'Neill would not 
punish conservative Democrats. Of course, a large number of 
liberals in the Ninety-eighth Congress could instruct and 
the Committee on Committees did not renominate some Boll 
Weevils.
A Stronger DSPC, Speaker, and Party?
Undoubtedly, Speaker O'Neill would have preferred an 
active DSPC. Because its director, S. Ariel Weiss, also 
served as the chief man on issues for the Speaker, the 
organization could have been better coordinated into overall 
legislative strategy. Yet by entering the DSPC in select 
fights, O'Neill rather chose to escape many defeats. While 
this dodged occurred, Democrats have had no real center to 
rally around.
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A wide base of inclusion made anyone wing of the party 
a defacto minority. Furthermore, the Democrats have resided 
in power so long that the idea of working together became 
ingrained even though no such tradition has been inherited. 
The party could have increased the chance of function as a 
unit through several options. First, the leadership could 
order Boll Weevils to vote the party line. This move would 
nonetheless backfire and force the membership as a whole 
into the minority. Obviously, Speakers regarded this move 
as impudent. Second, the leadership could name more appoin­
tees, rather than elected members, to the DSPC. This change 
would give the Speaker more control over its composition; he 
could then better adapt the DSPC to party purposes.
Third, the Democratic Caucus could surrender its veto 
power over committee assignments. At the expense of demo­
cratization, the Speaker would gain greater control over the 
party. Fourth, an informal group chosen by the Speaker 
could fill committee seats. Instead of the present Commit­
tee on Committees, a cliquish formation would take away from 
state delegations and other groups the ability to cuts 
deals; in turn, O'Neill would receive greater potential 
influence•
Actually, the membership of a truly executive body for 
the caucus should have consisted of the three top party 
officials and all the committee chairmen. If the Speaker 
regained the power over the appointment of chairmen, all the 
better for him. In the present decentralized House, one
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could never seriously consider this change. Nonetheless, a 
revamped DSPC would become a more suitable arbitration and 
planning board for the rank and file. The recent structure 
contained too many politically insignificant personalities.
Finally, the Speaker could retain only the most quali­
fied staff from the DSPC. By working with just efficient 
employees, he would preside more effectively. At least, 
quarters for the DSPC in the Capitol building would provide 
it with greater status. Anyone not associated with behind- 
the-scenes politics on the Hill might find this suggestion 
ridiculous. Unfortunately, it has been a true phenomenon. 
A DSPC situated nearer the House floor would painlessly gain 
greater prestige.
After O'Neill retires, the DSPC could become dormant 
once again. The next Speaker could also abolish the group. 
If the point is not obvious by now, the DSPC does not have a 
bright future since it failed to substantially strengthen 
Speaker O'Neill or Speaker Albert. Reforms in the 1970s 
lodged control with members themselves. They enjoyed 
authority and would not readily return it to the Speaker. 
O'Neill did exhibit some power, but not that of a broker. 
That is to say, influence dispersed has. not been regained 
through the this assembly.
A number of explanations persisted. For instance, the 
DSPC neither provided enough internal rewards to go along 
nor did it alter the relationship between constituent and
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member. The temper of the Democratic caucus and the presi­
dent, as well as the size of the conservative coalition, the 
DSPC could influence little these and other variables that 
effected the ability of a Speaker to shepherd programs 
through the House. Any thoughts of consistent solidarity 
directed through the Speaker and these representatives just 
grasped at thin air.
The DSPC perhaps unknowingly attempted to abide by 
party government. It has not been the key due to members 
who would not inordinately relinquish their freedom in order 
to pass more programs. No one argued for the imposition of 
a binding rule or the return to an autocratic Speaker. But 
greater flexibility in the scheduling of bills, the develop­
ment of party positions, and even power over committee 
assignments could not overcome the lack of party responsi­
bility in the House. Regardless of comparisons to the 
British model, an important aspect party government theory 
possibly has been misdirected since the DSPC could not 
nullify political realities just outlined. Unquestionably 
the assembly has done more than some congressmen antici­
pated, but less than some political scientists might have 
expected.
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